

***NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE***

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**CREDIBILITY IN PERIL: THE MISMATCH BETWEEN UK FOREIGN
POLICY AND CAPABILITY IN DETERRING AGGRESSION IN THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC.**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

Under the fiscal pressures presented by the recent recession, the latest British Strategic Defence and Security Review has been widely criticized for being finance rather than commitments led, in particular losing the carrier strike capability. This, coupled with a changing political landscape across South America and the significance of the Falkland Island (FI) Territories to Britain, suggests that a mismatch may now exist between national policy, strategy and resources. This mismatch will continue to be magnified as the Ministry of Defence is instructed to make further cuts in the coming years. This thesis aims to analyze the effectiveness of UK deterrence in relation to both British foreign policy and the current and potential future political landscape surrounding the FIs dispute. It will also aim to identify any disparity between desired influence and existing capability, making recommendations that will further inform the debate on maintaining a credible deterrence against potential aggression.

THESIS STATEMENT

During the period in which Britain is restructuring its defense capability to maintain global power projection, its stated political ends are not necessarily aligned with ways and means. A key national commitment is the defense and protection of the FI where deterrence strategy may need to be realigned and defense capabilities re-configured to match the current geopolitical climate. This will require a thorough study of deterrence and UK national interests to derive recommendations that meet short-term strategic goals.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my wife who did much more than her fair share while I worked away in my own world on the computer. Without her support and gentle persuasion the process would also have been longer and tortuous. This is also dedicated to both my wonderful daughters who have patiently waited and endured through this prolonged period of my averted attention; they can now have their father back, or at least until I go back to sea!

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Si vis pacem, para bellum
(If you want peace, prepare for war)¹

A great number of disputes that have exploded into military conflict since World War II have been over competing claims to territory and the population and resources within it.² The dispute over the Falkland Islands (FIs) is one such dispute that has endured between the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina since 1832. In 1982, tensions erupted into a military clash that resulted in the loss of 907 lives. Although it ended in a return to the status-quo, the essence of the conflict remains very much alive today. Indeed, both countries continue to restate their respective positions through the various military, economic, and constitutional aspects of the islands' sovereignty. Of greater significance is that the tensions have been re-vitalized in recent years and the status-quo is now at risk of breaking down once again. Consequently, UK deterrence policy is now, arguably, more important than it has been in the last 30 years. But is it still effective in the current climate? It clearly failed in 1982 and many of the issues that led to war at that time still exist.

Argentina has regularly used the medium of the annual United Nations (UN) Committee on Decolonization to voice its territorial claims to the islands and these meetings have become a diplomatic sparring arena between Argentine diplomats and the Falkland Island Government (FIG). More recently, tensions have been on the rise and by

¹ A latin axiom adapted from a comment in Book 3 of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus' tract *De Re Militari*, 4th or 5th Century.

² For example: Turkey-Greece (the ongoing dispute over Cyprus in which tensions significantly increased during the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974), the Iran-Iraq War (from 1980 to 1988, when Iraq invaded Iran following a long history of border disputes), Pakistan-India (Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1999 over Kashmir), Ecuador-Peru (a brief military clash in 1981 over a long-running territorial dispute).

mid-2012 they were, according to one observer, “at their worst point since the 1982 conflict.” These tensions are partly driven by current Argentine President Fernández de Kirchner’s hard line policies and partly by perceived FIG and UK provocative activities.³ The new round of strained relations and ‘tit for tat’ maneuvering was initiated in February 2010 when FIG-commissioned companies began exploration for offshore hydrocarbons in earnest. These mineral resources renewed the efforts to justify Argentine territorial claims and, in instant riposte, Argentina introduced new regulations that now require all ships traveling from Argentine ports to the FI to have a permit.⁴ More recently, the 30 year anniversary of the FI military campaign and a referendum on maintaining constitutional links with the UK further irritated the dispute, with a renewed diplomatic lobbying effort by Argentina, supported by some of its Latin American neighbors and others who oppose what they have called “colonial” rule.⁵ Furthermore, a modest but notable effort by Argentina to modernize its military with new naval patrol vessels and Mirage combat aircraft after decades of stagnation also adds pressure to the diplomatic standoff in the region.

Both ongoing and emerging internal problems also add serious pressures for Argentina that could be the source of escalation into a crisis or conflict. These include economic disorder, political upheaval, social instability, and declining military capability. After 30 years of growing prosperity, Argentina has entered a prolonged period of

³ Janes IHS Global, “Janes Sentinel Security Assessment, South America: Executive Summary, Argentina,” (Englewood, Colorado: IHS Global Limited, 2013), 19.

⁴ This new administrative process allows greater central control of permits, acting as a tool for diplomatic leverage and strategic messaging that further heightens tensions. See Claudia Dominguez and Brian Byrnes, “Argentina Requires Permits for Ships Heading to Falklands,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/02/16/argentina.falklands/> (accessed September 15, 2013).

⁵ Most recently Argentina’s lobbying was supported by Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, Nicaragua and Syria at the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization in June 2012.

relative instability where one analyst notes that, “social unrest, industrial and agricultural sector disputes, and economic fragility remain the country's most significant internal risk factors.”⁶ Additionally, President Fernández’s popularity is slipping as her administration pursues nationalist-populist discourse policies, ranging from castigatory import barriers to intensifying resource nationalism. International trade and finance experts, as well as media outlets and argentine opposition parties, have criticized these policies as contributing to the economic downturn. An increasingly fragmented political scene further fuels this situation with personality-dominated factions rather than ideologically driven parties competing for power. So, an internally generated crisis may yet emerge; under economic pressure and dwindling political support, the Fernández administration, or another popular leader, may seek to capitalize on national discontent and galvanize the population by re-claiming the FI by force. Alternatively, the party political system could further disintegrate to the extent that the military will once again take control, propelling the country into an unknown direction and a potentially dangerous foreign policy strategy that could cause a shift in the country’s approach to the FI issue.

There are challenges for the UK as well. Under the fiscal pressures presented by the recent recession, the latest British Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has been widely condemned by many military commentators for focusing on finance rather than commitments; the loss of a carrier strike capability for at least a 10 year period is especially significant. This rationalization of capabilities weakens the UK’s ability to project power globally. Budgetary pressures are also set to worsen, forcing the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to make further efficiency savings in the coming years, and the

⁶ Janes, “Security Assessment: Argentina,” 2.

possible impact of Scottish independence could weaken the UK armed forces to below critical mass.⁷ Magnifying this, archetypal overruns that traditionally plague defense procurement projects may result in a delay to the Queen Elizabeth Class carrier achieving full operational capability in 2020 as planned.

Thus, the geopolitical scene in the South Atlantic is potentially destabilized by the disputed ownership of extracted hydrocarbons in 2017, the modernization of the Argentine military, political and economic turmoil within Argentina, and the fiscal constraints that limit British military power. Any of these could create an incentive for Argentina to act, taking advantage of a window of opportunity, should the Argentine leadership wish to exploit it.

Consequently, effective deterrence is the key to the UK defense of the FI. History often shows that a defensive strategy which fails to adapt to the most recent political, social and economic circumstances of an adversary, as well as properly considering the environmental conditions and military capabilities, will end in catastrophe. In 1941, the Red Army was largely unprepared for the impending German Blitzkrieg, saddled with “an organizational ideology that was predisposed for the offensive.” The Soviets not only underestimated the striking power of the German army, but also more significantly, from 1940 Stalin pursued “a non-provocative stance towards the Third Reich to eliminate any pretext for an invasion.”⁸ The risks of this passive deterrence were ignored on the basis of German treaty security guarantees. Understanding the actual circumstances and factors

⁷ United Kingdom, House of Commons Defence Committee, *The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish Independence*, Sixth Report of Session 2013-14 (London: House of Commons Defence Committee, 2013), 9.

⁸ Cynthia A Roberts, "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 8 (December 1995), 1293-1321.

that first went on between the contesting states are crucial in generating an effective deterrence strategy, and they can be cogently examined through an ends-ways-means framework. In deterrence, the ends are centered on the will of the defender to pursue certain goals that enhance its security and these ends are defined as policies. The ways are driven by strategy and doctrine that determine the specific actions taken in support of the goals. The means are the elements of national power that are employed to carry out the planned actions, (e.g. diplomatic, military, and economic).

In the example above, the ends for the Soviets was to avoid war with Germany, driven by Stalin's policy of appeasement to Hitler; the ways were to have forward-deployed forces intended as a deterrent, backed by a diplomatic agreement of non-aggression; the means was the Red Army, deployed along a 1800 mile front, intended to provide a barrier to attack.⁹ This deterrence approach was adequate for the political-military conditions of 1939. But between 1940-1941, Germany dominated Europe and was looking east. Yet Stalin clung to his deterrence policy with disastrous results in June of 1941.

So, from a UK standpoint, the questions that emerge are: firstly, is strategy aligned with the resources available and does it sit at the right place on the continuum from influence to military action to provide the right level of deterrence to prevent a crisis? Secondly, is the political climate in the UK shifting and does this change the circumstance affecting deterrence? Thirdly, does Argentina have the will or capability to take the FIs by force again and, allowing for the most recent political and social factors, is the UK postured appropriately to prevent this? Finally, if the current circumstances have generated risk, how is this risk defined, and can it be reasonably balanced with

⁹ Roberts, "Planning for War," 1293-1294.

effective deterrence?

As the political circumstances change across South America and UK fiscal priorities shift, creating important new factors for policymakers, it is essential that policy (ends), strategy (ways) and capability (means) are all aligned to achieve effective deterrence with the right instruments of power applied creatively and effectively. If the UK fails at this task, the damage to its reputation on the international stage may be irreversible, with significant repercussions on other elements of its foreign strategy. The UK staked its political and military reputation on the FI, so its deterrence efforts must be effective for at least the next decade.

For both the UK and Argentina, deterrence related to the FI is influenced by two key considerations: political will and force capabilities. The shaping of any deterrence strategy is also determined by the three fundamental deterrence components of understanding the environment, intelligently communicating resolve, and credibility. Using an ends-ways-means framework, as defined above, this thesis analyzes all these elements within the context of the current and possible near-term geopolitical climate to identify the proper balance of risk and deterrence over the next 5-10 years. It examines what deterrence actions bring the UK as close to its ends as possible, by employing limited ways that allow for a tolerable level of risk; it is a question of tolerance, because the risk levels are high and cannot be completely eliminated. In the framing the discussion, this thesis firstly outlines the history and legality of the FI claims in the context of the stated UK and Argentine policies to compare the resolve or desired ends of both parties. Secondly, it reviews deterrence theory to extract key applicable ideas, before then analyzing how they may be used to best support UK deterrence strategy. Thirdly, it

examines the current and future capabilities of both Britain and Argentina to determine the means that shape the deterrence strategy. Finally, the thesis concludes by defining an approach and providing recommendations that further inform the debate on maintaining a credible and effective deterrence in the South Atlantic at an acceptable level of risk and cost.

CHAPTER 2: Background and perspectives on sovereignty claims

The Falkland Islands in context

The Falklands is an archipelago that lies approximately 500 kilometers off the coast of Argentina in the South Atlantic Ocean. It consists of 780 islands, of which East and West Falkland are the largest and form the bulk of the landmass. The first known landing on the islands was in 1690 by British Captain John Strong and, following the brief establishment of a French colony on east Falkland in 1764, another British explorer, Captain John Byron, landed on West Falkland to claim first possession of the island and all neighboring islands, thus establishing sovereignty for the British monarchy. Following this, the French and British were forcibly removed by Spain, leading to the Falklands crisis of 1770. With both sides facing an unwanted war and Spain militarily inferior, the British reestablished the colony the same year. Late in 1774, however, the British withdrew their colony as part of global realignment policy, but maintained their claim. In 1811 the Spanish colony finally left, leaving the island uninhabited until a small Argentine military detachment landed 37 years later to make Argentina's first claim. In response to this, HMS CLIO arrived a year later and British rule was reestablished for the last time in 1833. The current areas claimed by both nations and lodged with the UN are detailed in figure 1 on page 20.

One of fourteen remaining British Overseas Territories (BOT) around the globe, the FI has been continuously administered by the UK since 1833, with the exception of two months during the Argentine occupation in 1982. The area of these islands combined roughly equates to the size of the American state of Connecticut. As of 2012, the official population of the Islands was 2,932, with three quarters of the population living in the capital of Port Stanley. Outside of this there are various farms and settlements spread

across the archipelago. Its constitution first came into existence in 1985 and was re-written in 2008, in which the right for self-determination was enshrined into the text. Local democracy was also enhanced in the rewrite, with the UK government retaining enough sufficient powers “to protect UK interests and ensure the overall good governance of the territory.”¹ The Government consists of a legislative assembly, whose members are democratically elected to determine their own policies and legislation, as well as an Executive Council and a Judiciary.² Executive authority remains chiefly British controlled with the governor exercising it on the monarch’s behalf and the chief executive, as appointed by the Governor, acting as head of government. Of the population, heritage can be traced back through nine generations of islanders and opinion on national identity is split with 57 percent considering themselves as a ‘Falkland islander,’ 24.6 percent British, 8.9 percent St. Helenian, 5.3 percent Chilean, and 1.2% percent Argentine.³

Economically, the Gross Domestic Product is about \$160m annually, enabling the island to be self-sufficient (with the exception of defense). For more than 20 years, the cost of defense was borne entirely by the British government and no taxes are paid. It has low unemployment and the main bulk of economic prosperity comes from fisheries supplying markets in Europe and the Far East through the issuing of licenses. Agriculture also forms a part of the economy, as does as tourism, including ecotourism, which is

¹ Her Majesty the Queen, "The Falkland Islands Constitution Order 2008," (London: UK Government, 2008).

² Members of the Legislative assembly elect three of their number every year to this policy making body of the government. Ex-officio members from the Assembly also attend and it is chaired by His Excellency the Governor.

³ Falkland Islands Government Policy Unit, *Falkland Islands Census 2012: Headline Results* (Falkland Islands Government, 2012), 2.

growing rapidly. A recent discovery of hydrocarbons, as well as interest in further prospecting gives the islands new potential for untapped wealth that increases its strategic significance.⁴

From an international legal standpoint, the United Nations (UN) Charter advocates primacy for the respect of self-determination by all peoples. Additionally, the Special Committee on Decolonization at the UN annually discusses the issue of sovereignty of the FI by and there are three resolutions that outline the current position of the UN:

1. 1514 (XV) 14 Dec 60: Concerns the declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
2. 2065 (XX) 16 Dec 65: Reemphasizes the requirements of 1514(XV) and invites negotiations between Argentina and Britain to reach a peaceful resolution in the granting of independence to the people of the FIs.
3. 3160 (XXVII) 14 Dec 73: Urges the acceleration of the negotiations outlined in 2065 (XX) regarding a peaceful resolution to the question of sovereignty of the FIs.⁵

The UN has drawn a middle position, seeking an independent FI that is recognized by both the UK and Argentina.

An Island perspective

The crux of the FI viewpoint is founded on both heritage and self-determination.

⁴ Drilling by Desire Petroleum and Rockhopper Exploration in 2010-12 lead to the ‘Sea Lion Oil Discovery’ of an estimated 350 million barrels, with a plan to enter production in 2017. A Deep water gas campaign yielded some discovery but further exporation work is needed to establish the economic viability. More recently this year U.S. and Italian companies have signed farm-in agreements with Falkland Oil and gas. Estimates of potential resource wealth vary slightly, but it is generally reported that there is an estimated 60 billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of gas around the Falklands basin which, according to UK-based Edison Investment, would generate around \$167 billion dollars in royalties and taxes for the FI government. See Sarah Young, “Britain Set for Falklands Islands Oil Windfall,” *Reuters*, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/uk-falklands-oil-idUKTRE81F1LA20120216> (accessed October 18, 2013).

⁵ United Nations Publications, “United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2013,” <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml> (accessed October 23, 2013).

In terms of heritage, the assertion of the FI government is that the community was formed through voluntary immigration over the course of 200 years and, before the 1833 settling by the British, there was no indigenous Latin American population. The Falkland islanders argue that the UN Charter enshrines self-determination, and in doing so, they have decided to exercise their own self-determination and retain their links with the UK as a BOT. In 2012 the FI government made its position clear: “Though we value our links to the United Kingdom, we are our own community, free to determine our political future.”⁶ Also citing General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), which it believes is clear on the primacy of respect for the principle of self-determination for all peoples, they further maintain that this right is not being qualified and any attempts to qualify it within the UN have been rejected.⁷ In a recent letter to the UN its position was summarized as follows:

Despite such pressure we, and the Government of the United Kingdom, remain willing to enter into dialogue with Argentina. Our differences should be discussed in a reasonable and constructive way. We favour co-operation and peaceful co-existence in the South Atlantic and there are many important issues that we can both usefully address together. Neither the United Nations Charter nor General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) support the concept of two large sovereign states negotiating away the rights of self-determination of the peoples of any territory. We therefore hope that the United Nations will agree that it is no longer credible to view this issue as primarily a dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina, over and above the wishes of the Falkland Islanders.⁸

Judging from the 11 March 2013 referendum result, the population supports this

⁶ Falkland Islands Government, “Falkland Islands Government Website,” <http://www.falklands.gov.fk/> (accessed Aug 7, 2013).

⁷ UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) states that: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” See United Nations online, “United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2013.”

⁸ Gavin Short, “Letter to the UN Secretary General, March 14, 2013,” Falkland Islands Government, www.falklands.gov.fk (accessed October 15, 2013).

position with a 92 percent turnout and 99.8 percent voting in favor of remaining a BOT.⁹ The results raised the international profile of the issue and further legitimized the UK's position, particularly with twelve international observers from eight countries in attendance. A former resident of the FI, Alejandro Jacobo Betts, spoke at the UN in 2012, citing a pro-British psychological pressure, persecution, and discrimination against anyone opposing the government, claiming true self-determination was not a reality. He also argued that the UK has forced the evolutionary process along pro-British lines, due in part through "the contracting of UK labor and by obstructing Argentine settlers becoming citizens, or landowners, or voters."¹⁰ Although this accusation may indicate an intolerance of true multiculturalism on the FI, the feeling of the majority perhaps can be represented in this statement by Roger Edwards, a member of the legislative assembly, at the same UN meeting: "We do not feel that we are a downtrodden colony of an old Imperial Britain. We are proud, economically entirely self-sufficient, and our relationship with Great Britain regarding external affairs and defense is one of consultation, dialogue and partnership."¹¹

As is expected, the FI itself has a troubled relationship with Argentina and, in the FI government's view, there has been recent pressure brought against it through trade disruption and isolationist policies. The FI government criticized the Argentine government for "denying our right to exist as a people, and denying our right to live

⁹ The referendum was verified as free and fair by independent international observers from seven different countries from the United States, Uruguay, Canada, Mexico, Paraguay, Chile, and New Zealand.

¹⁰ United Nations Department of Public Information, "Special Committee on Decolonization Adopts Draft on Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Requesting Argentina and the United Kingdom Resume Talks as Soon as Possible," in GA/COL/3225 (New York: United Nations, June 21 2012).

¹¹ Ibid.

peacefully in our home.”¹² Moreover, there is an impression of Argentina waging economic warfare, manifested by withdrawing from resource management agreements, banning flights and shipping in territorial space, and harming hydrocarbon and fishing industries through economic blockade. The FI governor, speaking on 4 June 2013, accused Argentina of acting against the principles of the very resolution that it is using in its sovereignty argument.¹³ He further commented that “Argentine pressures are mainly affecting business opportunities for South American companies who are unable to take advantage of the new logistical opportunities that a successful oil industry will provide,” and spoke of “continued attempts by the Government of Argentina to impede certain sectors of our economy.”¹⁴

Argentine reaction to the hydrocarbon prospecting so far centers on diplomatic protest with no physical harassment. A number of partnerships over resource management and exploitation on which the two nations agreed in the 1990s have recently collapsed; a joint agreement over hydrocarbon exploitation broke-down in 1999 before the Argentine government then implemented a legal challenge in 2012 against the “unlawful hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities carried out in the Argentine Continental Shelf.”¹⁵ A bilateral agreement to manage fisheries in overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (established by the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission) collapsed in

¹² Falkland Islands Government, “Falkland Islands Government Website.”

¹³ Nigel Hayward CVO, “Falklands Governor Delivers Annual address, 4 Jun 2013,” UK Government, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/falklands-governor-delivers-annual-address> (accessed August 7, 2013).

¹⁴ Hayward, “Falklands Governor delivers annual address, 4 Jun 2013.”

¹⁵ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, “Situation of the Provisional Understandings: Malvinas, 2013,” government of the Republic of Argentina, <http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/es/situation-provisional-understandings> (accessed October 17, 2013).

2005 when Argentina disengaged from the arrangement. One agreement to co-operate in the sharing of information on joint fish stocks remains, although the FI government claims that “only the Falkland Islands has upheld its side of this agreement; the Argentine government has unilaterally reneged on nearly every point.”¹⁶

A British perspective:

The UK government is consistent in its legal claim to the FI, which the Ambassador last communicated in a 2013 speech at the UN: “The United Kingdom does not accept that Argentina has any legitimate claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands,... The United Kingdom has administered the Falkland Islands peacefully and effectively for more than 180 years. In 1850, by ratifying the bilateral Convention on Settlement of Existing Differences, Argentina acknowledged that there was no territorial dispute between the two countries.”¹⁷ Its intention to retain the FI as a BOT remains unchanged and, in this respect, since the end of the Falklands War, the officially stated position of the UK government remains one of protecting the rights and freedoms of the FI people. This position is routinely emphasized in speeches and government literature, and was recently mentioned in the Queen’s Speech in May 2013, highlighting the UK government’s intention to continue supporting FI freedom to determine its own political future.

The UK’s military posture is also unchanged since 1982 and purely defensive in nature; it exists, the UK argues, only to protect the rights and freedoms of the FI people

¹⁶ Falkland Islands Government, “Falkland Islands Government Website.”

¹⁷ United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “The UK Ambassador to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant, Responded to Statements About the Falklands During a UN Security Council Debate,” *Announcement*, August 7, 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-does-not-accept-that-argentina-has-any-legitimate-claim-to-sovereignty-over-the-falkland-islands> (accessed October 17, 2013).

to determine their own economic, political, and cultural futures. The cross-government strategy that is laid out the *Overseas Territories White Paper* supports this position.¹⁸ More recently, spurred by the celebrations surrounding the 30 year anniversary of the Falklands War, and fuelled by the implications of the SDSR, Prime Minister David Cameron's government was pressured to clarify its policy. In response, the Prime Minister stated that he was "determined to make sure that our defenses and everything else are in order... The key point is that we support the Falkland islanders' right to self-determination. I would argue that what the Argentinians have said recently is far more like colonialism, as these people want to remain British and the Argentinians want them to do something else."¹⁹

Concerning the UK government's reactions to recent Argentine actions, such as lobbying efforts at the UN and the active interference with FI trade, the UK has made it clear: "there will be no negotiations on sovereignty of the Falkland Islands unless and until such time as the Falkland Islanders so wish."²⁰ The UK also views the disruption to shipping as "unjust and counterproductive" to business and commerce, and the UK government has offered Argentina many opportunities for cooperation, but these have been rejected.²¹ It is evident that the position of the UK remains unchanged, although,

¹⁸ United Kingdom Overseas Territory Directorate, *White Paper: The Overseas Territories: Security, Success, Sustainability* (London: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, June 2012).

¹⁹ *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 538, no. 250, col. 745, January 18, 2012, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120118/debtext/120118-0001.htm#12011848000005> (accessed September 21, 2013).

²⁰ United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Statement of the Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Exercise of the Right of Reply to Remarks Made by President of the Argentine Republic on 25 September," *Announcement*, September 26, 2012 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/there-can-be-no-negotiations-on-the-sovereignty-of-the-falkland-islands-unless-and-until-such-time-as-the-islanders-so-wish> (accessed October 17, 2013).

²¹ United Nations Department of Public Information, "Special Committee on Decolonization

diplomatic channels and the offer of cooperation have not been closed off. In fact, the UK government stated most recently in 2012 that it had a desire to have “a constructive relationship with Argentina.”²²

The Argentine perspective

From an Argentine perspective, its claims to sovereignty are founded on historical rights. It asserts that the Malvinas (FI) form part of the province of Tierra del Fuego, which was originally part of Spanish possessions in South America. The first Argentine claim was in 1820 when a naval officer took possession of the Islands on behalf of the United Provinces of the River Plate without protest from Britain. Since then successive Argentine governments have consolidated this claim through various actions, such the appointing of governors and enacting legislation. In 1829 the Argentine government enacted a decree concerning the “political and military” command, which Britain immediately contested, and in 1832 a small Argentine military force occupied the Islands.²³ The British expelled this force in 1833, maintaining that the occupation was illegal. The Argentines repeatedly dismissed this argument, claiming instead that their territory was “usurped” by a British force.²⁴ Argentina’s current demands are enshrined in its constitution, which details that the outcome of any negotiations should be full

Adopts Draft on Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Requesting Argentina and the United Kingdom Resume Talks as Soon as Possible," in *GA/COL/3225* (New York: United Nations, June 21 2012).

²² United Nations Department of Public Information, "Special Committee on Decolonization Considers 'Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)', Hears from Petitioners, Island Assemblymen, Argentina's President," in *GA/COL/3238* (New York: News and Media Division, United Nations, June 14 2012).

²³ Public International Law, "Argentina's Position on Different Aspects of the Question of the Malvinas Islands," <http://www.dipublico.com.ar/english/argentinas-position-on-different-aspects-of-the-question-of-the-malvinas-islands/> (accessed October 17, 2013).

²⁴ A statement commonly used by President Fernández and was used during her last visit to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization in June 2012.

Argentine sovereignty of the Islands (Figure 1 shows the current Argentine claims to the FI, South Georgia, and South Sandwich islands).

Historically, Britain has had cultural and trade relations with Argentina, and during the 1990s under President Nestor Kirchner, relations between the two countries flourished. By 2007 Britain enjoyed strong economic links with increased investment into the country and burgeoning exports, as well as a host of bi-lateral trade agreements.²⁵ More recently, under the leadership of President Kristina Fernández de Kirchner, relations have soured as the Argentine government began to adopt a stronger stance, becoming more vocal on the international stage, and taking measures aimed at reversing cooperation. Nationalism and a focus on obtaining control of valuable natural resources appear to be the cause.

From the current Argentine standpoint, the UK is expanding its militarization of the South Atlantic and Argentina has urged compliance with UN resolutions to negotiate and refrain from such action.²⁶ In response to the first deployment of the T45 destroyer to the region last year, and in concert with the posting of His Royal Highness Prince William to the FI, President Fernández lodged a formal complaint to the UN regarding the “militarization” of the South Atlantic, declaring it a “grave risk for international security,” further pleading with Prime Minister Cameron to “give peace a chance.”²⁷ She also criticized the UN as having different standards for its members, suggesting that the

²⁵ House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee. “Trade with Brazil and Mercosur.” *Seventh Report of Session 2006-07*, vol. 1. (London: The Stationary Office, May 22, 2007).

²⁶ UN News Centre, “Ban Urges Dialogue in Dispute Over Falkland Islands (Malvinas), February 10, 2012,” <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/html/realfile/story.asp?NewsID=41204&Cr=argentina&Cr1=#.Uoi4-7FOmM8> (accessed September 20, 2013).

²⁷ Barry Henderson, “Cristina Kirchner Says Britain 'Militarising' South Atlantic,” *The Daily Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/9067918/Cristina-Kirchner-says-Britain-militarising-South-Atlantic.html> (accessed September 16, 2013).

UK as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was allowed to disrespect resolutions.²⁸

In concert with these diplomatic proposals, Argentina has applied coercive economic measures against the FI with increasing intensity over the last few years. In its first significant act in February 2010, Argentina passed a Presidential Decree (256) which placed tighter controls on shipping transiting from the Islands to Argentina, purporting that it was needed to protect Argentine interests and resources.²⁹ Following this, in December 2011 Argentina persuaded its Mercorsur Bloc partners to block all ports throughout the region from those vessels flying the FI flag.³⁰ At the summit where the restriction was approved, Fernández declared that, “when you are signing something on the Malvinas in favor of Argentina, you are doing it in your own defense.” She further accused the UK of “taking our energy and fishing resources.... and when they require more resources they who have armed forces will go and seek out wherever they are and however they see fit.”³¹ Other provocative measures included the boarding of European fishing vessels operating under FI fishing licenses and successfully pressuring Uruguay

²⁸ United Nations Department of Public Information, "Special Committee on Decolonization Considers 'Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)', Hears from Petitioners, Island Assemblymen, Argentina's President," in *GA/COL/3238* (New York: News and Media Division, United Nations, June 14 2012).

²⁹ *Buenos Aires Herald*, “Cabinet Chief Confirms Government Decree Strengthens Malvinas Control,” <http://www.buenosairesherald.com/BreakingNews/View/25456> (accessed October 17, 2013).

³⁰ Mercorsur, translated as Southern Common Market, was established in 1991 as a political and economic agreement between the nations of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Bolivia to promote free trade and the movements of goods, people and currency.

³¹ Andrew Hough, “South American Trading Bloc Bans Ships with Falklands flags,” *The Daily Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/8969569/South-American-trading-bloc-bans-ships-with-falklands-flags.html> (accessed September 16, 2013).

to twice deny British warships from docking in Montevideo.³² The UK and FI governments accused Argentina of pursuing a policy of confrontation after a published report stated that the Argentine Industry Minister, Debora Giorgi, spoke to 20 firms and urged them to switch from UK imports to those produced elsewhere.³³

Regional and International perspectives.

Argentina is proactive in garnering international support on the FI issue through the UN with its neighboring Latin American countries through the medium of Mercosur, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (CELAC) sessions.³⁴ Its efforts have filtered through to the UN, creating “strong regional support” as acknowledged by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon during last Special Decolonization Committee meeting, where representatives from Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay were present.³⁵ These three Latin American countries supported Argentine claims since 1996, when Mercosur members conveyed their full support for Argentina’s “legitimate rights” in the Declaration of Potrero de los Funes. Since then, regional states have principally voiced their support for Argentina through communiqués from these

³² HMS Nottingham in 2007 and HMS Gloucester in 2010 were both denied access to Montevideo after routine requests to use the port for a logistics stop. *Merco Press*, “Argentina Confirms High Seas Boarding of Spanish Fleet Fishing in Falklands,” <http://en.mercopress.com/2011/11/28/argentina-confirms-high-seas-boarding-of-spanish-fleet-fishing-in-falklands> (accessed August 14, 2013).

³³ BBC News, “Argentina Pursing Policy of Confrontation, Says no 10,” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17205918> (accessed August 14, 2013).

³⁴ Formed through a Constitutive Treaty that was signed in 2008, UNASUR is an intergovernmental agreement that integrates two existing customs unions (Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN)). The group includes Mercosur nations plus Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Guyana and Suriname and its intention is to use the European Union (EU) model to eventually form a new community, including a parliament, common currency and passport. Created in 2011, CELAC comprises of all 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and is a regional mechanism for political dialogue and cooperation designed to deepen Latin American Integration as an alternative to the Organisation of American States (OAS), which was set up by the U.S. in 1948.

³⁵ UN News Centre, “Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Dispute Tops Talks Between Ban and Latin American Officials,” <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44503&Cr=falkland&Cr1=> (accessed August 14, 2013).

cooperative alliances. In December 2001 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile declared an economic blockade of the FI, but it was quickly rescinded following discussions with the UK concerning the “practical implications” of domestic and international law.³⁶ During a CELAC summit, the President of Uruguay said that solidarity among South Americans “for the moment” was key to Uruguay’s foreign policy, but he also declared that Uruguay would not blockade the FI as he did not “have anything against England.”³⁷

Among other nations, the FI issue remains consistently uncontroversial, with the majority echoing Russia and China’s position in backing a peaceful outcome to the dispute in support of the relevant UN resolutions. Countries such as Syria have been more charged in their statements, which are centered on their commitment to ending colonialism worldwide.³⁸ The stance of the U.S. government is marginally more supportive of the UK but, in concert with most other nations, remains tactful in its remarks: “This is a bilateral issue that needs to be worked out directly between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom. We encourage both parties to resolve their differences through dialogue in normal diplomatic channels. We recognize de facto United Kingdom administration of the islands but take no position regarding sovereignty.”³⁹

³⁶ House of Commons, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 538, no. 245 (2010), col. 83W, January 10, 2012, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120110/text/120110w0004.htm> (accessed September 7, 2013).

³⁷ Hough, “South American Trading Bloc Bans Ships with Falklands Flags.”

³⁸ United Nations, “Special Committee on Decolonization GA/COL/3238.”

³⁹ U.S. Department of State. *Daily Press Briefing: U.S. Position on the Falkland (Malvinas) Island*, by Victoria Nuland (Washington, DC: January 12, 2012).

Summary

The people of the FIs desire to maintain their current arrangement as a BOT. Despite the UK still taking an active role in the governance of the Islands, the new constitution was a shrewd move in providing the Islanders with a sense of independence, with the theme of self-determination featuring heavily. For many generations, the inhabitants were British and their economy remains healthy with substantial growth potential that is unburdened by UK taxation and defense costs. Consequently, the strong cohesion that forms part of FI culture in combination with the economic benefits and assured protection means that they are unlikely to change their affiliations in the near future.

The UK position has been consistent in maintaining its historical claims of sovereignty, yet also being committed to defending the FI population's right to choose its own future, which includes independence. As long as the Islanders continue to elect for British rule, the question of sovereignty remains a non-negotiable prospect.

Argentina claims historical rights to the sovereignty of the FI, arguing that their rights precede that of Britain and that the territories were taken by force in 1833. Their stated aim is consistently articulated as the return of the FI to Argentine sovereignty, which is ultimately motivated by the close proximity of a traditionally powerful nation's territory. Argentina's efforts to rally international support achieved some successes, particularly from those opposed to perceived colonialist rule, and it has managed to leverage a sense of regional protectionism from its burgeoning Latin American economic and military partnerships. In general, however, the international community takes a hands-off approach, in the form of non-threatening diplomatic statements.




Figure 1- Claims and Potential Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction in the South Atlantic and South Oceans by Argentina and the UK⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Durham University International Boundaries Research Unit, "Claims and Potential Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction in the South Atlantic and South Oceans by Argentina and the UK," https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/south_atlantic/ (accessed September 20, 2013).

CHAPTER 3: Defining ends

“There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.” Napoleon Bonaparte

This chapter assesses the security goals, or ends, of both the UK and Argentina in relation to the political climate and their declared positions and intentions concerning the FI. It specifically looks at the resolve of both nations as a chief indicator into the motivating factors behind policy decisions.

Determining UK resolve: policy and politics

Since the 2010 general election, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition holds a strong majority in Parliament and the alliance remains steady. Yet now this government is mid-way through its current term, inter-party tensions are emerging caused by: issues over European integration, the growing public unpopularity following the implementation of harsh austerity measures to deal with the enormous fiscal deficit and, as the elections draw closer, a desire for the parties to remarket themselves as separate political entities.¹ The coalition is, therefore, unlikely to survive the next election and a hung Parliament is highly possible.² Nevertheless, with the Labour party as the only serious contender and another coalition likely, the political climate is unlikely to shift radically away from the center, with respect to both internal and external policies.

Internally, the UK government's focus is firmly fixated on economic recovery. This dominates politics because of doubts over the sustainability of current fiscal policies

¹ The Political Risk Service Group Inc, “United Kingdom Country Report” (Syracuse: The PRS Group, Inc., 2013), 1-3.

² A hung parliament within the UK parliamentary system is when neither major political party (or bloc of allied parties) achieve an absolute majority of seats in parliament (legislature). A coalition must then be formed to establish a majority or parliament dissolved and a fresh election held.

caused by their poor progress to date in consolidating public finances.³ This matter is likely to increase in importance for both parties of the coalition as the next election approaches. The referendum on Scottish independence, due in September 2014, is also likely to change the political landscape; if implemented, will be a significant game-changer both economically and militarily. Predictions on the outcome of the referendum are difficult to make, with strong Scottish nationalist feeling generating a ‘yes’ on the one side and those who are more skeptical about Scotland’s ability to be financially independent on the other. As a result, full independence may be rejected in favor of enhanced devolution.⁴

From a national security perspective, the main effort for defense remains Afghanistan until the conclusion of the UK’s combat mission at the end of 2014.⁵ Internally, the focus is counter-terrorism, particularly in the wake of the bombings in London in 2005 and failed attempts in 2006 and 2007. These bombings provided the catalyst for the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) that draws together all elements of defense, international security and counter-terrorism. The NSC regularly publishes a National Security Strategy (NSS) that lays out governmental policy in the form of a grand security strategy that outlines the security priorities and threats faced by the UK, along with associated National Security Tasks. Regarding the FI, the NSS alludes to maintaining the ability to project power in protection of the three

³ The Economist, “United Kingdom Country Report” (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013), 3.

⁴ Ibid., 4.

⁵ UK Ministry of Defence. “PM Announces UK Troop Withdrawals from Afghanistan.” *Announcement*, July 6, 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-announces-uk-troop-withdrawals-from-afghanistan> (accessed November 14, 2013). See United Kingdom National Security Council, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* (London: The Stationary Office, October 2010), 13.

interconnected areas of security, prosperity and freedom. In particular, part of UK national security is about protecting UK persons in their rights and liberties.⁶ This includes the people of the FI as UK citizens and this lies at the heart of the UK position: “We need to make sure that key messages about the Island’s status, constitutional and legal position, and the overriding determination of the community to remain a British Overseas Territory are fully understood internationally.”⁷ Indeed, the UK legal and ethical position hinges on maintaining the will of the FI people to remain British.

Within the NSS the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) prioritizes all areas of risk that may emerge over a five and twenty year horizon. Within this, an attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider conflict is identified within the third tier of three in terms of likelihood and impact. In this respect, it does not recognize the potential for a crisis in the FI as a near-term highest priority objective, yet it emphasizes that every item in all three tiers are significant concerns and “require government action to prevent or mitigate the risk.”⁸ Furthermore, the management of the FI dispute and associated response is later alluded to in six of the eight broadly defined National Security Tasks, and specifically in Task six: “where necessary, intervene overseas, including the legal use of coercive force in support of the UK’s vital interest, and to protect our overseas territory and people.”⁹

The main security interest of the UK in the FI is enshrined in its stated obligation

⁶ United Kingdom National Security Council, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*, 23.

⁷ Nigel Hayward CVO, “Falklands Governor Delivers Annual Address, 4 Jun 2013,” UK government, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/falklands-governor-delivers-annual-address> (accessed August 7, 2013).

⁸ United Kingdom National Security Council, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*, 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

to protect the Islanders and the territory as part of national interests. The recent *Overseas Territories White Paper* further expands upon this, in which it identifies all BOTs as providing strategically located bases for the UK and its allies to support a wide range of security operations. Figure 2 depicts all fourteen BOTs and demonstrates that a preponderance of these territories lay in the South Atlantic, elevating the strategic importance of the region for the UK.




Figure 2- Map of British Overseas Territories Locations.¹⁰

The White Paper also alludes to encouraging British businesses to pursue investment and trade opportunities; despite the cost of the FI's defense without any tax revenues to offset the expense, there are benefits for UK companies.¹¹ Oil and gas analysts, as well as

¹⁰ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Overseas Territories: The Ministry of Defence's Contribution* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011), 1.

¹¹ The cost of FI defense is estimated as 0.177 percent of annual UK defense budget. Falkland Islands Government, "Falkland Islands Government Website," <http://www.falklands.gov.fk/> (accessed Aug 7, 2013); UK Overseas Territory Directorate, *White Paper: The Overseas Territories: Security, Success*,

financial commentators in the media, predict future economic windfalls for UK hydrocarbon companies, as well as the securing of preferential access to energy resources in the future.

The ends: UK security goals

The current ends for the British government is the preservation of the FI as a BOT, together with the maintenance of its territorial integrity at minimal expense while the attention of UK policy is focused on economic recovery and counter-terrorism. While the FI is not a top security priority, the preservation of the status quo remains a key security goal. As an ultimate aspiration, the Argentine acceptance of UK sovereignty is a long-term goal that would guarantee security, yet this must be achieved without jeopardizing any preferential relationship with the FI or being of economic disadvantage to UK businesses.

Determining Argentine resolve: Policy and politics

Struggling to regain the relative prosperity it enjoyed at the beginning of the twentieth Century, Argentina still carries the scars of three decades of authoritarian-military rule under Juan Perón. The influence of the Perón period is still strong at the policy level and the effects of the so-called ‘Dirty War’ continue today. Indeed, the Peronist Justicialist Party (*Partido Justicialista: PJ*), “remains the single most significant dominant political force.”¹² The defeat in the 1982 war in the FIs assisted in bringing about democratic rule in 1983, followed by a surge of liberalization, and then an economic boom in the 1990s, driven by President Carlos Saul Menem. During this

Sustainability (London: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, June 2012), 9.

¹² Janes IHS Global, “Janes Sentinel Security Assessment, South America: Executive Summary, Argentina,” (Englewood, Colorado: IHS Global Limited, 2013), 2.

period it promoted a free-market economy and spread out its commercial interests globally, as well as restoring diplomatic relations with Britain after being frozen following the Falklands war. Constitutional reform followed in 1994, and in 1999 it was even designated a major non-NATO Ally (MNNA) by President Bill Clinton.¹³ This period of affluence ended abruptly in 2001 with a financial crisis and then two years of depression, shocking the large middle class, which assumed that the country had been on the path to first-world status. After Néstor Kirchner's election there was a return to positive growth.

In 2007, President Kirchner was succeeded by his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. More recently, popular support for her left-leaning coalition government, in particular the Front for Victory (FPV) fraction of the JP, dwindled from a post-election high of 54 percent in October 2011 to currently 40 percent. This has been brought about by continuing poor economic performance, corruption scandals, and a forceful style of governance.¹⁴ The FPV failed to secure a majority in either legislative chamber in the October 2011 elections, and only held onto power through support of its allied parties.

There is evidence of growing social unrest that manifested itself in many demonstrations, including one in the capital in April 2013, which involved an estimated one million people.¹⁵ The demonstrations were largely over reforms of the judicial

¹³ Following this constitutional reform, the government is now a presidential representative democratic republic with the president acting as head of state, head of government and Commander in Chief of the Argentine armed forces. Executive power is exercised by the president with legislative power vested in both the Executive and National Congress.

¹⁴ The Political Risk Services Group Inc., "Argentina: Country Report," (NY, USA: The Political Risk Services Group, Inc., 2013), U-2.

¹⁵ Janes Report attributes social unrest mainly to inflation and labour salary disputes; the relationship between the government and the powerful General Workers Union is a continual cause of friction.

system, which are aimed at giving greater transparency, thus reducing cronyism and corruption. Critics claim, however, that the proposed changes were a “backward step that will further politicize the legal system and speed Argentina’s descent into authoritarianism.”¹⁶ There are also rumors that the government will force a constitution change to allow a third term of governance.¹⁷ This seems to have fuelled the FPV’s declining popularity, but Fernández’s course towards despotism, through radical steps such as constitution change, is concerning.

To realize her policies, Fernández will have to invigorate her popularity, which may require some radical steps. She will also be fearful of losing power and control when faced with poor economic performance, the pressure of social unrest, and an increasingly atomized political scene “dominated by factions based on personalities rather than immediately identifiable political ideologies.”¹⁸ She may leverage nationalist fervor to boost her public approval ratings by either shifting the blame or focus on another issue that will divert attention and galvanize the nation. Analysts previously pointed to Argentine politicians seeking to divert voters from the pain caused by inflation and reduced subsidies on oil, gas and electricity. Professor Mark Jones of Rice University, an expert in Latin American politics, recently observed that “The government is being squeezed from lots of different areas, so one way to distract from the economic problems facing the country is to raise the Malvinas issue. . . .It is one of the few issues outside

¹⁶ The Political Risk Services Group Inc., “Argentina: Country Report,” U-4.

¹⁷ Ibid, U-1.

¹⁸ Janes, “Security Assessment: Argentina,” 2.

football that you can get universal consensus on.”¹⁹

More recently in October 2013, Fernández had major surgery, leading her critics to express fears among some observers that “given a centralization of power in Ms. Fernández's hands, any serious deterioration of her health would risk creating a power vacuum and serious instability.”²⁰ Although power is centralized in the executive branch, and there is no clear successor should Fernández's health deteriorate further, the election scheduled at the end of 2015 may bring some stability with a new administration. There is no clear forecast of who is likely to win, and risk will remain with an economy struggling to recover in a system of weak institutions, political polarizations and fluidity of loyalty, powerful unions and a history of mass public protests.²¹

Although domestic politics historically shaped Argentine international affairs, the president and key confidants determine policy with little input by either the military or foreign ministry. Argentina lacks a coherent national foreign and defense policy. Strategic planning in Argentina is also influenced by a short-term mindset that pervades Argentine politics; policies rapidly change direction depending on domestic political needs and perceptions of the president. Policy is driven by the president's objective to retain and fortify her power within the executive branch.²² This is a careful balance

¹⁹ Barry Neild and Dave Gilbert, “What Lies Behind Renewed Tensions Over the Falkland Islands?,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/03/world/falklands-argentina-background/index.html> (accessed October 3, 2013).

²⁰ The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Argentina: Political Stability,” <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=881170472&Country=Argentina&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Political+stability> (accessed November 15, 2013).

²¹ Ibid.

²² Mark P. Jones, “Strategic Posture Review of Argentina,” *World Politics Review*, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8191/strategic-posture-review-argentina> (accessed November 15, 2013).

between preserving of her influential links with the Argentine elite that control the provinces and maintaining popularity with the organized labor unions and other social groups.

Concerning the FI, the ‘Transitional Provision I’ of the Argentine Constitution of 1994 states that:

The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and non-prescribing sovereignty over the Malvinas, the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and over the relevant maritime and insular areas, as they are an integral part of the National territory. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, with respect for the way of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law, are a permanent and un-relinquished goal of the Argentine people.²³

The determination of Fernández’s administration towards realizing this goal is, however, difficult to gauge. This can possibly be attributed to the short-termism of Argentine politics and the shifting pressures of the domestic climate. Of late, Fernández appeared to lean towards maintaining a diplomatic resolution to the dispute, asserting that Argentina is “just asking to talk” to “renew negotiations” that were stalled on the death of President Juan Perón and that the dispute was not over resources, but an exercise in “self-defense” and of solidarity in support of Argentina’s sister nations.²⁴ She also stated recently that “Argentina is committed to a peaceful and diplomatic course.”²⁵ Argentina has not threatened military action at any juncture, but instead focuses its criticisms on UK

²³ República Argentina, “Question of the Malvinas Islands,” government of the Republic of Argentina, <http://eaust.mrecic.gov.ar/en/node/1248> (accessed November 14, 2013).

²⁴ United Nations Department of Public Information, “Special Committee on Decolonization GA/COL/3238,” 8.

²⁵ Merco Press, “Malvinas Alleged ‘Militarization’ Again the Obsession of Cristina Fernandez at Anti-nuclear Conference, August 23, 2013,” <http://en.mercopress.com/2013/08/23/malvinas-alleged-militarization-again-the-obsession-of-cristina-fernandez-at-anti-nuclear-conference> (accessed November 14, 2013).

militarization.

The ends: Argentine security goals

Due to the nature of Argentine decision-making, the direction of Argentine national security and defense policy is difficult to predict beyond 2015. Moreover, the problems caused by the government's failing economic policies and decline in popularity, combined with the recent discovery of hydrocarbons and the anniversary of the Falklands War, gives Fernández the opportunity to increase the intensity of her rhetoric. It is unclear how far she is willing to go on the issue as pressure mounts on her administration. She may feel compelled to escalate if the economy continues to worsen and the elections draw nearer, although taking any violent action would significantly discredit her peace-orientated philosophy upon which she heavily relies to argue her case on the international stage. Nevertheless, beyond 2015 continuing domestic instability remains a distinct possibility and a new administration is likely to have the necessary power and nationalist backing to externalize any public discontent should it feel it is to the administration's advantage.

CHAPTER 4: Deterrence strategy.

The notion of deterrence has existed as a concept between rival factions since the dawn of conflict and has existed in many guises at many different levels, from simple blood feuds between individuals, to a globally played nuclear stalemate. Deterrence between nations originally existed as largely coercive strategies, such as those employed by the ancient Greeks.¹ Texts by famous strategists on war are also littered with deterrence-related theses that form an integral part of their works on foreign relations and conflict. After 1945, in the shadow of nuclear devastation, think tanks generated an explosion of deterrence theories and a great deal of literature on the specific subject of deterrence, particularly in the context of nuclear-armed rivals. As a largely cognitive subject, however, there is not a one size-fits-all solution. Furthermore, there are many elements to consider and challenges to overcome in generating and executing a successful deterrence strategy. The focus of this chapter is to look at some of these elements and challenges, as well as to examine particular deterrence theories and models that relate to the FIs, identifying where any of these may be appropriate in crafting a deterrence policy to achieve Britain's desired political goals. Firstly, this chapter discusses the general concept of deterrence, before then looking at deterrence in practice to identify some key deterrence components that can be applied to the FI dispute and scrutinized for efficacy of effect in order to develop recommendations that can be applied to the UK's 5-10 year deterrence challenge for the FIs.

What is deterrence?

Deterrence in its purest form is to prevent someone from doing something he would otherwise do. In this notion, it is largely a psychological concept, attempting to

¹ Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides and Deterrence," *Security Studies* 16, no. 2 (Apr 2007): 164.

change the mindset of someone such that an action that he is considering is seen as unbeneficial to him; in essence, the benefits of inaction outweigh the costs of any action. In terms of deterrence between nation-states, the leaders of a challenger nation will take into account the potential consequences of any action it is contemplating to achieve its goals at the expense of a defender nation, while simultaneously avoiding actions whose adverse repercussions outweigh achieving the desired outcome. The leaders of a defender nation will require a strategy that exploits any influences that prevents a challenger nation from taking action that would be detrimental to its security.² For the defender, therefore, it is this stratagem that defines any deterrence action.

The level of tension between both challenger and defender is one of the most significant factors that determine how both sides interact with one another in a deterrence situation. The level of tension will change as it is influenced by both internal and external stimuli, shifting the current situation from its existing status quo to a new condition along the sliding scale from benign interaction to the brink of armed conflict. For example, the defender may consciously act out an element of its deterrence stratagem; or the challenger may act to test the defender's resolve; or an external influence, such as a third party, could become involved, which neither party anticipates. To help our understanding of this relationship between defender and challenger on this scale of escalation in relation to the basic actions and reactions of both sides, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett offer a simplified explanation, as detailed in Figure 3.³ The deterrence continuum is represented by five stages as the situation between defender and challenger progresses from general

² Sir Michael Quinlan, "Deterrence and Deterrability," in *Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment*, ed. Ian Kenyon and John Simpson (Oxon: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2006): 3.

³ Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 1 (March 1993): 62.

deterrence to immediate deterrence, and then armed attack. General deterrence is a confrontational relationship between two states where at least one leader considers resorting to force to change the status quo and the opponent in response maintains forces while offering warnings against any threat of force contrary to its own interests.

Immediate deterrence exists when officials in one state consider launching an attack.

Leaders of the other state are aware of this and begin issuing threats in retaliation to prevent the attack.⁴

Stage	Action
1	One state adopts a policy of general deterrence to deter another state from altering the status quo.
2	The challenger makes a threat to change the status quo. The policy of general deterrence and the maintenance of forces while offering warnings has now failed; there is a challenge against the general deterrence measures.
3	The defender strengthens its commitment to its own territorial defense or issues or enhances a commitment to an ally. At this stage the defender will have assessed if these commitments are worthwhile or provocative. A policy of general deterrence has failed and the defender adopts a policy of immediate deterrence, issuing threats in retaliation to prevent the attack
4	The challenger decides not to back down and presses ahead with the attack despite the immediate deterrent threat.
5	Immediate deterrence has failed. The defender must decide if they wish to resist militarily or accept new conditions.

Figure 3- Crisis Escalation Table

Escalation at any stage can be halted or crises averted by the actions of either the defender or challenger. For example, if the defender offers no counter-threat or the challenger reassesses its position in the new condition and withdraws its threat. In these circumstances, a new situation may be temporarily established at a higher level of tension, or the situation could de-escalate back to stage one under different conditions.

⁴ Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 38-43.

Therefore, each stage may involve a number of sub-moves, each with various options, all occurring relative to time and with multiple influences. A definitive tipping point or point of no return is, therefore, difficult to determine, because at any juncture a decision or action by either side, or external influence, may cause an unexpected change in the cost-benefit calculus of the challenger such that the challenger believes that a continuation of its challenge is now unbeneficial. Nevertheless, the aim of the defender's deterrence stratagem is to be agile and responsive enough to maintain the stage one status quo, regardless of what internal and external stimuli act upon the deterrence relationship between both challenger and defender.

Developing this concept further and linking back to the cost-benefit calculations of both defender and challenger, the valuations of the costs and benefits by both sides have different objective and subjective features, depending on what stage has been reached. For instance, a defender increasing its military capability at Stage One may provoke a far different response if it were to do the same at Stage Three. At Stage Three it may successfully deter further escalation, but at Stage One this may provoke a responsive fear that results in a security dilemma: an unintended reaction that leads not to a maintenance of the status quo, but to the challenger increasing its military capability in response.⁵ The outcome may then be an arms race. Ironically, a defender can make itself less secure by threatening the challenger in this way and to such an extent that tensions are increased, making conflict more likely than before the deterrence action was taken. A security dilemma may also emerge if the defender is suspected of concealing its true capabilities. Faced with this uncertain threat, a challenger may feel compelled to respond

⁵ Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *World Politics*, vol. 44, no.4 (July 1992): 506-507.

by bolstering its own defenses, or in extremis, conduct a pre-emptive attack. As Frank Zagare and Marc Kilgour argue through deterrence modeling, “increasing the costs of conflict (to a challenger) does not necessarily lead to increases in strategic stability,” as beyond a certain point any increases become counter-productive or unnecessary.⁶ Consequently, for the defending strategist, the quandary of where that balance between deterrence and escalation lies remains uncertain and influenced by many factors, but founded on an understanding of the cost-benefit calculus of both sides, as well as an awareness of what stage they are at in a crisis situation.

Deterrence in practice: an analysis

The international system is a complex environment that is seemingly anarchic and fraught with considerable risk for those operating in it. Hence, a key factor that merits important consideration when assessing a state’s decision-making calculus is its rationality. A rational actor is one that examines their clearly stated and ranked set of goals, evaluates them according to their utility and then selects the one that has the highest payoff.⁷ Rational deterrence theory works in the same way, in so far as the assumption is that an actor will always act rationally to maximize their utility. This is generally the case for most state actors, although a number of factors cause a distortion of this to the observer, creating an impression of irrationality based on unpredictability. Robert Jervis, a lead deterrence theorist, surmises that purely assuming that people act to maximize utility will not provide a comprehensive enough answer as “subjective elements loom large. . . . This is true not only for values and utilities, but also for the

⁶ Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (March 1993): 19.

⁷ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 13-54.

crucial means-ends beliefs, perceptions of the other side, and estimates of the probable consequences of alternative policies.”⁸

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett hypothesize that a rational challenger may consider any military action as too risky, only being viable if diplomacy fails to alter the status quo at less cost. Although when diplomacy fails it is easy for leaders to use the efforts made as a justification for military force to achieve their goals.⁹ Huth and Russett further observe that “from the perspective of a rational, self-interest-maximizing leader, an alternative to manipulating the economy may be to divert dissatisfaction or antagonism toward a longstanding rival. There is increasing evidence of this behavior when the economy is weak, when elections are near and (especially) when poor economic conditions coincide.”¹⁰ This is known as diversionary theory, where leaders externalize discontentment onto other states or ethnic groups, perhaps using nationalist passions to gain a short-term boost in popularity. The validity of the diversionary theory hypothesis in international relations is a matter of great debate among academics. Some offer extensive historical evidence for the United States, Israel, Britain, and other democracies, particularly during periods of economic hardship.¹¹ The Falklands conflict in 1982 is often cited as an appropriate example of a diversionary conflict where the Galtieri regime saw the acquisition of the FI as a valuable distraction from economic contraction and a

⁸ Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 207.

⁹ Huth and Russett, "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals," 66.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 65-66.

¹¹ See Bruce Russett, "Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict," in *Prisoners of War*, ed. Charles Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky, (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1990), Chapter 2, and Bruce Russett and Gad Barzilai, "The Political Economy of Military Actions: Israel and the United States," in *The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States*, ed. Alex Mintz (London: Routledge, 1992).

foreign debt crisis. Others argue that “there is no consistent and meaningful relationship between the internal and external conflict behavior of states,” and that “there are limitations within the quantitative empirical literature that supports diversionary theory.”¹²

In maximizing their utility, challengers can be also be willing to gamble if they are already in an unacceptable status quo and, despite unknown elements, there is a chance of reaching a different acceptable condition. In his study, *A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence*, Jeffery Berejikian challenges the part of traditional deterrence theory in which successful deterrence hinges on rational decision-making and effectively communicating a readiness to inflict heavy cost upon an adversary if it adopts unacceptable policies.¹³ Part of the argument is that “a state operating under an unacceptable status quo . . . has an opportunity to improve its position.” When the gamble of taking action “contains an unexpected value of further loss, but also some probability of approaching an acceptable status quo, the . . . state would accept the gamble.”¹⁴

Thus, the challenger’s cost-benefit calculus is also affected by the cognitive influences of those involved in the decision-making process, as well as both internal and external pressures. The challenger’s decision to threaten the status quo centers on how it perceives the defender’s intentions and resolve, as well as, by implication, the factors of

¹² Jack S. Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in *Handbook of War Studies*,” ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 282.

¹³ The crux of prospect theory is that, subjectively, there is a diminishing return to increasing gains. For example, an initial windfall of \$100 is more highly valued than the same amount when added to an initial gain of \$1000. For losses there is a similar relationship.

¹⁴ Jeffery D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 2 (March 2002): 165-181.

understanding, communicating, and establishing credibility that influence those intentions. This, in part, allows the challenger to calculate the costs and benefits of an action.

Understanding The Environment

For both actors, fully understanding the environment, including all the linkages, influences, personalities, and real capabilities as they all relate to the opponent's strategy is extraordinarily difficult because of the number of interacting features, the effect of unpredictable shocks on the system (such as secret alliances, internal political struggles or external pressures from other parties), and overarching all - the human element. Discussing complexity and chaos theories in the context of the strategic environment, Harry Yarger explains that unpredictability is an inherent part of non-linear complex systems; "outcomes cannot be understood or predicted by the simple act of adding up the parts and relationships,"¹⁵ he notes. Strategists must be, as Harry Yarger urges, "constant students of the strategic environment . . . emerged in the events of today while aware of the legacies of the past and possibilities of the future."¹⁶

In formulating a deterrence strategy in the contemporary world, making sense of the environment is challenging, but essential. For the defender, a primary goal is not only understanding the environment, but also understanding the challenger; as the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO-JOC) states, "successful deterrence is knowledge dependent."¹⁷ Any challenge to the defender's desired status quo is influenced

¹⁵ Harry R Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 23.

¹⁶ Ibid, 73.

¹⁷ United States Strategic Command, *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept. Version 2.0*

by the perceptions of the current situation formed through collection, assessment and understanding of information. Deterrence often fails when the messages intended to shape perceptions are misinterpreted or ignored. There are many examples throughout history in which perceptions of a defender's likely reaction to a challenge were based on a misinterpretation of collected information, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba. This issue of misunderstanding is particularly problematic when the human element of decision-making injects an element of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Assumptions made where information is incomplete also magnify the issue. Conversely, a defender can fail to communicate a message of deterrence or intent effectively, because of a misinterpretation of information about a challenger. In 1941, for example, British planners made many poor assumptions and overly optimistic assessments with regard to sending a strong deterrence signal to Japan. The British Admiralty and Prime Minister Churchill misunderstood Japan's challenge to British interests in Asia and the dispatch of an inadequately sized fleet intended to deter Japan had no effect. Both vessels were subsequently sunk by Japanese air power within hours of their arrival. This defeat marked a watershed in the history of Royal Naval maritime dominance; no longer did Britannia rule the waves and the credibility of Britain in the protection of its empire was irreparably damaged.¹⁸

Misperceptions also often arise when a state's goals and values do not align with

(U.S. Department of Defense, December 2006), 5.

¹⁸ Christopher M. Bell, "The 'Singapore Strategy' and the Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z," *The English Historical Review* 116, no. 467 (Jun 2001): 604-633.

the opposing state, or one state fails to understand the complexity of the other state's decision-making process. In 1973 Israel believed it was effectively deterring Egypt because it had dominant air power. Yet, Israel ignored the ground force adaptations that largely negated Israeli air power and misinterpreted the Egyptian leadership's willingness to take a significant risk in striking the first blow to gain a highly desired political strategic benefit.¹⁹

A challenger's decision to act against a defender is also besieged by cognitive influences, particularly when there are many individuals involved in the decision. Decision-makers are predisposed to emotional stimuli, as well as personal or collective historical experiences. This human trait commonly occurs when an individual is flooded with complex information and, as a coping mechanism, the mind selectively processes and recalls information. These are called heuristics, or mental shortcuts, and for every individual they will be different. Two examples of heuristics are interpreting events through familiar past individual or collective experiences or attaching greater importance to certain dimensions of a problem based on one's background and preferences. Thus, heuristics can foster a certain mindset in a decision-maker. For example motivated by a willful blindness to other possibilities, Stalin's accommodation toward Nazi Germany was partly to blame for the Red Army's unpreparedness to resist the German attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941.²⁰

Therefore, trying to understand how a challenger will act in any given situation is exceptionally difficult because information on which to form perceptions will never be

¹⁹ Abraham Rabinowich, *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed The Middle East* (New York: Shoken Books, 2004), 21-23, 25-30, 44.

²⁰ Roberts, "Planning for War," 1293.

complete, and so decisions can never be made with complete certainty. Furthermore, the actions or intentions of a challenger can be misunderstood by leaders who ignore, misinterpret, or disregard information.

Communicating the message

Transmitting an effective and unambiguous message of deterrence is another crucial hurdle that confronts the defender. Primarily, the expression of will to defend must be communicated. Too few, or the wrong sort of resources invested, or poor messaging generates a danger that the defender communicates a lack of resolve to protect its interests. In the case of Vietnam, the reduction of U.S. airstrikes in concert with “frantic diplomatic activity to try and get negotiations restarted” sent the unintended message to the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi that the U.S. lacked the will to fight.²¹ Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership were prepared to continue committing forces despite suffering heavy losses in combat against a superior force, fueled by the belief that the U.S. would lose its will to fight far before North Vietnam would ever abandon its goal to unite Vietnam. This resolve was demonstrated by drafting 125,000 17-year olds every year between 1965-1975 into military service.²² The political purpose of the cessation of bombing operations against North Vietnam was designed to test the reactions of Hanoi and give the leadership an opportunity to move towards a peaceful solution, yet the North Vietnamese interpreted the message as a “worn out trick of deceit.” In this case, words and actions from the U.S. were misunderstood, leading to

²¹ Grant U.S. Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1978), 80-104.

²² Lawrence E. Ginter, "Requirements of Strategy in Vietnam," in *Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing US Strategies for Future Conflict*, ed. Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 129.

the North Vietnamese deriving a conclusion exactly opposite to what the Americans intended.

This divergence of interpretation illustrates the importance of using specific language in communicating intent to a challenger. Politicians often use historical metaphors to “activate conscious and subconscious, rational and emotional responses” in their listeners.²³ Properly targeted and in the right context, they can be highly effective in transmitting the intent of the defender. For instance, the Clinton administration made extensive use of metaphors during the 1999 Balkan crisis with some success to transmit both intent and resolve.²⁴ In particular, powerful messages can be sent using words, such as “genocide” or “holocaust,” with heavy metaphorical overlay that resonate with the international community. But metaphors evoke different emotions for different groups whose collective memories vary; metaphorical messages that are distinct in one culture can be misconstrued when received by another. In Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2005 “World without Zionism” speech, an English metaphor was applied to a phrase that was translated as, “Israel must be wiped off the map.” This unintended metaphor is now firmly rooted in popular imagination and often used as proof of Iran’s genocidal intentions, yet the true meaning within Persian culture was somewhat less inflammatory and “there is general agreement among translators and scholars that Mr. Ahmadinejad did not commit his country to the project of destroying Israel.”²⁵

²³ Francis A Beer and Christ'l de Landtsheer, *Metaphorical World Politics* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 10.

²⁴ Roland Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 3 (2002): 423-450.

²⁵ Robert Mackey, “Israeli Minister Agrees Ahmadinejad never Said Israel Must Be Wiped Off the Map,” *New York Times*, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/israeli-minister-agrees-ahmadinejad-never-said-israel-must-be-wiped-off-the-map/?_r=0 (accessed October 23, 2013).

Nevertheless, the damage to Iran in its diplomatic relations with Western nations was significant.

Associated with the importance of transmitting for a clear understanding is also an empathetic view of the perception of the challenger. Particularly at the leadership level, egocentric biases of over-confident policy makers who are irrevocably absorbed in their chosen ideology or beliefs make it difficult to generate empathy. To overcome this situation, messages need to be crafted to take into account the challenger's security concerns, yet clearly communicate the risk of any action that the challenger is considering.

The demonstration of capabilities also provides some deterrence effect. A message of this type that is too strong, however, risks communicating malign intentions to the challenger. One of the conundrums of deterrence is to know the point at which the challenger's will has been pushed too far so that it crosses the threshold from successful prevention to threatening aggression. The aim should be to push the boundaries without provoking a reaction that will cause a counter-action and crisis escalation. In terms of military power, more is not necessarily the best approach. During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, there was a dangerous lack of clear communication between Washington and Beijing that risked an unwanted escalation to a direct military clash. Beijing believed it had made its intentions clear to warn America to not interfere with Taiwanese affairs. The U.S. was, however, uncertain about how far the People's Republic of China would be prepared to go and misunderstood its posturing against Taiwan as the prelude to an invasion.²⁶ The two countries narrowly avoided conflict, highlighting that it is hazardous

²⁶ Andrew Scobell, *Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis* (Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Stanford Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 1999), 16.

to rely on military power alone to relay strategic messaging without appropriate understanding and empathy.²⁷

Credibility

Maintaining credibility presents another challenge to the defender. A deterrent position that lacks credibility is likely to fail. This is because credibility forms a key part of a challenger's decision calculus. Achieving and maintaining credibility and reputation is especially difficult, as it hinges on the subjective assessment of the challenger and changes under the pressure of many influences. As problematic as credibility is to measure or control, its importance on the decision calculus of the challenger cannot be ignored. There are two key parts of credibility that are essential to both a defender's messaging and posture: having the right capability to maintain a deterrence effect and maintaining a reputation that serves to support the deterrent intent.

Deterrence requires communicating implicitly or explicitly that a nation has the appropriate capability to support the deterrence intent. Any capability employed must be applied to achieve the required effect on the challenger's cost-benefit calculus. Too much capability may be interpreted as threatening or bullying, yet too little may result in deterrence failure and, with it, a loss of credibility to act upon one's deterrent messages. Credibility of a deterrence message is, therefore, dependent on both the existence of capability and whether the challenger believes the defender will use the capability. Capabilities available must be employed within their limits to provide the proper influence on the challenger's cost-benefit calculus. If messaging and capability are mismatched, the defender risks eroding its credibility and its ability to successfully enact

²⁷ Zehn Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory of Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2012), 93-94, 131-133, 165-66, 188, 194.

future deterrence strategies.

Employing the right combination of assets with the right capabilities will also affirm a defender's credibility or even enhance it. For instance, when the Syrian crisis flared up in 2013, the deployment of U.S. forces off the Syrian coast backed up the diplomatic pressure applied by President Obama; the posturing of credible assets generated a flurry of actions from other nations and preserved U.S. credibility to project power in support of its interests. The reputation of U.S. military power, amply demonstrated over the past 10 years undoubtedly shaped responses from Syria and other countries.

Credibility is also inexorably linked to the reputation of a state; any loss of reputation will have the same effect as a loss of credibility. Conversely, the building of a defender's reputation will bolster its credibility and, thus, enhance its ability to deter. As the prominent deterrence theorist Barry Nalebuff points out, "a country's reputation is multidimensional, and . . . the value of reputation depends on how others interpret it."²⁸ During the Berlin crisis in 1961 President John F. Kennedy emphasized the significance of the U.S. reputation when he said in a meeting, "if we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where will we later stand? If we are not true to our word there, all that we have achieved in collective security, which relies on these words, will mean nothing."²⁹ Certainly, because diplomatic rhetoric is sometimes not acted upon, a state tends to be judged more by its actions than its words. Reputation is also built over time and because it is a significant factor in predicting the future actions of a state, a challenger's decision

²⁸ Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," *World Politics* 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 315-16.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 315.

may rest on its perception of a defender's reputation as much as the capabilities it has to deter.³⁰

Although a defender's reputation is clearly important to bolster its credibility to deter, the defender must also judge the challenger's reputation as well. Reputation is endogenous in nature and affected by changes in a country's internal politics. Normally there is a continuous element to reputation, such as a country's ideology, but the challenge for the defender is to decide how much to believe. In this, understanding the challenger and continual interpretation of inferences from the challenger is fundamental in identifying any consistency in behavior by key individuals or governmental systems, which may then, in turn, be incorporated into the deterrence calculation.

Applying deterrence components to the UK deterrence challenge in the Falklands

The UK must concentrate its deterrence efforts on maintaining the current status quo with the FI, yet be flexible enough to continue to maintain an effective deterrent position even if Argentina takes action to change the status quo. As was outlined in this chapter, this is a most challenging situation, requiring resources to be focused on the three key components: a comprehensive understanding of the challenger and the decision environment, the effective communication of an unambiguous message, and credibility.

Understanding

The basic aim of deterrence is simple, but its conduct is largely a psychological concept and the environmental setting is complex. Thus, understanding is the crucial enabler of deterrence. Without it the UK cannot measure Argentina's decision making calculus or appreciate all the factors that affect it. Striving for perfect understanding of

³⁰ Ibid., 314-16.

the decision environment will enable the UK to balance all instruments of national power with maximum efficiency to target the Argentine decision-making system with an effective and unambiguous message to maintain the status quo.

Within this balance is judging when the status quo is in danger and compensating actions can be taken that influence the decision environment and maintains effective deterrence. The pervasive human component of decision making also adds an element of uncertainty. To compensate for this challenge, UK analysts and decision makers must approach every issue with a level of empathy that avoids biases. Understanding the lenses internal actors employ through which every message and action flows and through which all view Argentina is the key to self-understanding. Conversely, empathy places the decision maker into the Argentine position, allowing a critical analysis of messaging and level of resolve. Dynamic understanding and the associated knowledge sharing across government departments to develop the most effective messages to Argentina can accomplish this.

Communicating

Messaging should be crafted to communicate the cost of conflict to Argentina and Britain's commitment to the defense of the South Atlantic territories without creating a security dilemma. These messages must be capable of passing through the heuristic lenses of Argentine analysts, governmental advisors, and decision makers. Subtle messaging should be avoided; intent should be clearly communicated through simple and unambiguous statements to avoid misinterpretation. Similarly, any actions taken should be patent in their meaning, measured in their conduct, and overt in their nature in concert with the deterrence message. In particular, the sufficiency of the defensive capabilities

employed must be emphasized in such a way that their potentially hostile nature is played down, thus avoiding the potential to create a security dilemma. Overall and most decisively, all elements of UK national power must be coordinated to ensure that both messaging and actions are harmonized. A unitary approach that is derived from unambiguous messaging is pivotal to lessen any opportunities for misinterpretation or miscommunication.

Credibility

Deterrence credibility and, by extrapolation, the reputation of Britain is clearly a broader issue than just the FI dispute. The preservation of UK national interests expands to include all fourteen BOTs, as well as the defense of the global lines of communications needed for economic prosperity and national security. In this respect, failure to maintain the status quo in the FI is likely to have a catastrophic impact on the UK's perceived ability to defend its interests. Accordingly, Britain's membership in security alliances will also be considered of less value as will its ability to support its partners and allies around the globe will be brought into question.

Credibility consists of two parts: resolve and capability. Resolve is demonstrated through messaging and capability is reinforced through messaging. This means employing capability to project the right amount of power to deter, as well as maintaining the correct balance between forward deployed and standby military forces to ensure that the overall effect shifts the risk-balance equation against Argentina. Credibility also involves the legal and moral authority to deter and protect legitimate interests in the eyes of the world. Failure to take firm and unwavering action when necessary, or hesitate on messaging, would result in an erosion or loss of UK reputation, which would then act

negatively on Argentina's cost-benefit calculations, leading to a crisis.

Summary

Successful deterrence strategy supports pursuance of strategic ends founded on the basic concept of a defender manipulating the cost-benefit calculus of its challenger by either reducing the perceived benefits or increasing the costs of any action to such an extent that the challenger is dissuaded from making the decision to change the status quo.³¹ The likelihood of a challenge also balances heavily on the resolve of both sides. The challenger's resolve to escalate within a calculated level of risk, as well as its perception of the defender's resolve, capability, and intentions forms the core of the challenger's cost-benefit calculus. A number of objective and subjective factors influence this cost-benefit equation, and the most crucial of these are understanding, communicating, and establishing credibility. The defender must contend with an environment in which understanding is always incomplete, due to the intricacies of the continually evolving domestic and international environment; an environment that is besieged with human inputs, unforeseen shocks, and heuristics. The defender's ability to communicate an unambiguous deterrence message in a way that it is not misinterpreted by the challenger is also fundamental in this respect. Finally, credibility is established upon effectively demonstrating resolve through capability reinforced messaging.

The UK requires an understanding of the cost-benefit calculus as seen through the eyes of Argentina. It then needs a feasible strategy that will influence Argentine decision makers in the desired way; the aim of this strategy is to reduce the benefits and increase the costs for Argentina, such that any contemplated action becomes an unattractive proposition. Its strategy should reflect a depth of understanding of Argentina and the

³¹ Zagare and Kilgour, "Asymmetric Deterrence," 19.

deterrence environment such that the right message of intent to deter can be communicated with credible resolve and without ambiguity to achieve the desired intent.

CHAPTER 5: Linking understanding to means: an analysis.

Argentine political calculations concerning national security are not just based on domestic politics, but also on the strength of the means available to realize any action that is being deliberated. The support of alliances, economic strength, and force capabilities will feature strongly in the cost-benefit calculus of Argentine decision-makers. Similarly for the UK, force capabilities and other elements of national power will be the crucial elements in delivering the deterrence strategy in line with government policy. Yet resources are finite and the FI is just one of many commitments for Britain. The ultimate array of means does not exist to match perfectly the ends and this brings with it a significant element of risk. As identified in the previous chapter, understanding the resources that are available and the dynamics that affect these resources for both defender and challenger is paramount in determining the severity of this risk. Consequently, this chapter derives some level of understanding to the current defender-challenger situation by using the DIME framework so that recommendations can then be made that bring this risk down to a tolerable level.¹ It focuses specifically on the impact of the resources which are available from now to 2020, which represents the highest risk period for the UK: a time during which UK defense is tackling a significant unfunded liability and before Future Force (FF) 2020 is planned to come online.

Argentina – The challenger evaluated through the DIME Framework

Diplomatic

Argentina faces no significant external security threats and enjoys a strong

¹ Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic: elements of national power available to the government in pursuit of national objectives. Other frameworks offer an expanded spectrum of factors, such as the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure (PMESII) concept, however the DIME headings have been chosen for the purpose of simplicity to illustrate the concept.

relationship with most of its neighbors, chiefly brought about through the development of trade links as a part of Mercosur and as a member of both UNASUR and CELAC. It is also a signatory to the Rio Treaty which agrees to collective security amongst twenty-two American State members, including the U.S. Among its South American neighbors, such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, historical rivalries exist but common trade interests and the flourishing UNASUR organization have generally strengthened relations.² Brazil appears to be its closest ally, bolstered by Brazil's enthusiasm to improve co-ordination of the region's military forces.³ Lately they have agreed to a cyber-defense alliance following the recent scandal of alleged U.S. espionage on Latin American countries.⁴ This agreement serves to further spoil relations with the U.S. which have been plagued by a series of incidents and diplomatic clashes which began with the seizure and search of a U.S. Air Force aircraft in 2011. Earlier this year U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, acknowledged the "difficult" relationship due to Argentina's relationship with the international financial community.⁵

Over the last few years President Fernández cast her net further out both in terms

² For example, in 2011 UNASUR created a think-tank called the Centre for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) to contribute to the "coordination and harmonisation of defense policies in South America". South American Defence Council: Centre for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED), "CEED Home page," <http://www.ceedcds.org.ar/English/01-CEED/01-Mission.html> (accessed November 19, 2013).

³ For instance, Argentine navy aircraft routinely operate from Brazil's aircraft carrier and both have signed agreements to integrate their arms industries, including plans for the joint construction of a nuclear submarine.

⁴ RT, Argentina, "Brazil Agree on Cyber Defense Alliance Against US Espionage," <http://rt.com/news/brazil-argentina-cyber-defense-879/> (accessed October 6, 2013).

⁵ In March 2012 President Obama announced that Argentina would be the first country to be suspended from the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for failure to pay compensation to two U.S. companies over a investment disputes. In addition, Argentina was moved to a major money country category on the jurisdictions of primary concern list following the publishing of the U.S. State Department's annual International Narcotic Control Strategy report. The Political Risk Services Group Inc., "Argentina: Country Report," (New York: The Political Risk Services Group, Inc., 2013), 19.

of trade and military agreements, signing an agreement on defense-industrial cooperation with South Africa in 2010 and a military cooperation agreement with Venezuela in 2012. Combined with the defense co-operation generated by CEED, these arrangements will enable cheaper modernization either through direct access to arms or the development of new technologies. Outside of South America, despite deep historical ties with Europe and the U.S., Argentina has begun to shift the balance of its alliances to the People's Republic of China (PRC); since 2001 the PRC has continued to invest heavily in Argentina to the extent that it has now given Argentina "strategic partner" status. Although investment is largely resource-based, memorandums of cooperation exist that enhance cooperation.⁶

Information

Argentina has built a strong internal and external information campaign against the UK and Fernández is proactive in using the opportunities available across a number of public forums, such as the UN, UNASUR, and nuclear summits. Her heightened rhetoric was particularly prominent during the 2012 anniversary of the Falklands War and during the time that hydrocarbons were discovered. In general, the existing narrative centers on the UK's alleged abuse of its influential position as a UNSC member, its military presence as a disruption to the peace of the region, its colonialist rule of the FI, and the theft of South American resources as "unilateral and illegitimate acts."⁷

⁶As an illustration, in mid-2012 the Argentine Minister of Defense, Arturo Puricelli, and his Chinese counterpart signed a memorandum of cooperation that is primarily focused on establishing bilateral military exercises, instructor exchanges, 'knowledge sharing' regarding peace keeping operations and extended defense industrial collaboration. Furthermore, Puricelli stated that he would seek Chinese technology to replace aging UK equipment for the navy. Janes IHS Global, "Janes Sentinel Security Assessment, South America: Executive Summary, Argentina" (Englewood, Colorado: IHS Global Limited, 2013), 37-49, 104.

⁷ A response given to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires following a complaint by the British government over Argentinean Presidential Decree 256/2010 and Disposicion 14/2010 which stipulated that all vessel travelling to and from the FI territories must have prior approval from the Argentine Government.

Although developing an indigenous cyber capability in partnership with Brazil, Argentina is not known to have an Information Warfare capability. Furthermore, current cyber development plans concentrate on defense rather than offence.⁸ With respect to the intelligence community, following a long period of secretive practices the Argentine congress passed a new legal framework and created a new National Intelligence system with legislative oversight in 2001.⁹ Policy shaping remains personality driven and centralized with the President who appoints the Defense Secretary and Under-secretary, as well as sets the National Intelligence Plan and Policy. The main focus of the intelligence services is terrorism and counter-drug, although the FI is outlined as “an interest.”¹⁰

Military

The Argentine military is a well-organized force that is among the most capable in the region, with a proven joint and combined capability that was demonstrated during a recent disaster relief exercise. In the past, however, its growth and modernization were hampered by a lack of political will and fiscal problems. It is also still plagued by public mistrust as a result of its past association with Juan Perón’s dictatorship.

In 2011 Fernández implemented a modernization program, “*Plan de Capacidades*

⁸ Janes IHS Global, “Security Assessment: Argentina,” 75.

⁹ Hans Born and Arnold Leuthold, The Argentinean National Intelligence Law, 2001 and the Regulation of the National Intelligence Act 2002, in *Intelligence Legislation Model* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2011); Eduardo E. Estévez, “Executive and Legislative Oversight of the Intelligence System in Argentina: a New Century Challenge,” in *Conference of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces* (Oslo, 2003), 1.

¹⁰ Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies” (Monterey, CA: Proceedings from an International Roundtable on Intelligence and Democracy, The Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004), 1-27; Janes IHS Global, “Security Assessment: Argentina,” 105.

Militares” (PLANCAMIL), to reverse the neglect suffered by the military since 1983.¹¹

This program concentrates on the protection of Argentine natural resources and will be funded by a planned increase in the defense budget from 0.8 percent to 1.3 percent of GDP over the next five years. Significant procurements include an amphibious support ship, four new Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPV) and Mirage fighters from Spain.¹² It is not clear how much of this new capability will be fully operational before 2020.

Force levels stand at 73,100 active military (38,500 Army, 20,000 Navy, 14,600 Airforce) and 31,000 paramilitary. Principle assets include 11 naval surface combatants, three submarines, and 121 combat capable aircraft. This inventory has aged from lack of funding, yet the armed forces are assessed to “have a modest capability for power projection with limited tactical airlift capability.”¹³ Naval forces have operated as far as the Persian Gulf and can independently deploy a battalion, as proven during recent UN mission to Cyprus. It is believed that Argentina has no strategic weapon capability yet, although it carried out “a considerable degree” of research on nuclear and ballistic weaponry. Recently Argentina tested an indigenously produced missile that has a range of 100 kilometers. Military doctrine focuses on “a war for resources” over water, anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics operations, and includes a scenario for taking the FI by force, although this part of doctrine is not reflected in training or the military preparedness

¹¹ Ibid., 102.

¹² Inigo Guevara, "Argentine Economy to Fuel Modernisation Plan," *Janes Defence Weekly*, August 25, 2011; Juan Manuel Barragan, "Argentina Receives Offer of Modernised F1Ms from Spain," *Janes Defence Weekly* 45, no. 33 (August, 2008): 35-41; Marco Giannangeli, "Jet Fighter Threat to the Falklands," *Daily Express*, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/419522/Jet-fighter-threat-to-the-Falkland-Islands> (accessed September 15, 2013).

¹³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 2013," vol. 113 (London: Routledge, March 14, 2013), 432.

cycle.¹⁴ Argentina enjoys strong military partnerships with Brazil in particular, which includes large bi-national exercises and smaller periodical exercises.

Civilian-military relationships remain an internal stress point in Argentina. In 2003, faced with the possible interference of human rights enquiries by officers involved in the “Dirty War” of the 1970s, the newly elected Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, purged the army senior leadership of twenty of its thirty-seven generals. In particular, Nestor Kirchner replaced the head of the army with a trusted ally, General Roberto Bendini, circumventing the rules controlling government military promotions by reaching down twenty places. Bendini then set about repopulating the army high command with loyal officers, ensuring that Kirchner had support among the officer corps and little resistance against any contentious policies he was to enact.¹⁵ This potentially allows the Argentine leadership to operate outside the governing rules should they so wish. At the same time, it may indicate that the Argentine civilian leadership is asserting what Samuel Huntington describes as “objective control”.¹⁶

Economic

The economic dynamic is linked closely to the political stability of Argentina, particularly as it is currently in economic turmoil or, as some would argue, even on the brink of collapse. Néstor Kirchner’s heterodox economic approach continued into President Fernández’s years; a policy that failed to implement the necessary structural

¹⁴ Janes IHS Global, “Security Assessment: Argentina,” 104-105.

¹⁵ David Pion-Berlin, “Informal Civil-Military relations in Latin America: Why Politicians and Soldiers Choose Unofficial Venues,” in *Armed Forces & Society* 2010, no. 36(3) (April 2010): 536-7.

¹⁶ Under objective control military professionals remain separate from the political system, completely subordinate to civilian leadership, focussed on their profession of arms and politically neutral. Objective control is preferred in a democratic system as the state is secure through optimized military effectiveness and the government secure through military neutrality. Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 80-83.

reforms to prevent a repeat of the 2001 crisis. The weak public finances and consumer based economy makes the economy vulnerable to external shocks, such as the recent economic downturn, and leads to higher than average inflation. These trends are set to continue as the government imposes ad hoc policies to curb inflation and boost trade.¹⁷

The government adopted significant measures of control, such as limiting investments of assets abroad and freezing retail prices at supermarkets.¹⁸ Such extreme measures cause uncertainty within the markets and hampers growth through lack of investment. Indeed, the stability of government policy making and national resources are fundamental, particularly when the government holds ownership of companies in many key sectors such as transport, utilities, construction, finance and insurance.¹⁹ Although popular nationalist strategies such as these are likely to dissuade foreign investors, it only weakens the economy further. Yet, there are positive indicators, such as, unemployment falling to a 2008-12 average of 7.8 percent. In addition, there are a number of positive social indicators such as literacy rates at 98 percent, and decreasing infant mortality rates. Finally, although dropping drastically in 2012, Argentina had the highest real GDP growth in South America during 2011.²⁰

¹⁷ For example, in 2012 the Fernández administration approved an expensive expansionary budget against the backdrop of rapid foreign currency reserve drawdown. This will lead to issues as the currency reserve is the government's main source of servicing the country's debt. They are also controlling this drawdown by tightening controls on imports and Foreign exchange. This, set against weak external conditions, affects the ability of companies to obtain equipment and raw materials, which in turn both discourages investment and negatively impact exports. This will only serve to amplify the downturn in the near future and restrict a rapid rebound when external markets begin to improve. The Political Risk Services Group Inc., "Argentina: Country Report," U1-5.

¹⁸ Ibid., U-3.

¹⁹ The re-nationalization of the Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) Treasury Petroleum Fields in 2012 is one such example.

²⁰ The Political Risk Services Group Inc., "Argentina: Country Report," 8-10.

Assessing Argentine options

Argentina has three broad options available to challenge the status quo that are within its means and beyond the strategy of diplomatic and legal measures that it currently employs. On the most extreme end of the scale, Argentina may attempt a surprise military assault that aims to give UK forces little or no reaction time to reinforce. Success would be predicated on two objectives: neutralizing British air superiority and then delivering enough forces to the archipelago to seize Mount Pleasant airfield.²¹ If surprise is achieved, then a rapid and decisive action that utilizes the bulk of Argentine assets may achieve these goals, leaving the UK with a similar problem that it faced in 1982; a challenging amphibious assault 8,000 miles from the UK with few logistical nodes close by. Any challenge of this nature would, however, erode Argentina's peace-pursuing, moral high ground, which forms a core pillar of its information campaign that aims to garner international consent for its actions. Moreover, conflicts are costly in many respects; ironically, success or defeat only risks weakening the country economically and militarily, but also could lead to economic isolation from key investors in the international community. The military is also unlikely to act in isolation from the government, although it has sufficient capability to act as a credible threat. Yet, poor historical performance, lack of investment in equipment, and civil-military tensions has

²¹ The improved facilities at Mount Pleasant airfield would offer a distinct advantage to the occupying Argentine forces. As Professor Michael Clarke assesses, the airfield "is a critical military asset... whoever controls Mount Pleasant controls the Islands," so "if Britain ever lost Mount Pleasant to a competent occupier, its forces would never get back onto the Islands, even with twice the military assets now available." Professor Michael Clarke, "The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012," *Royal United Services Institute*, <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref%3AC4F6324444BE2E/#.UozfxLFomM8> (accessed November 2013, 2013).

eroded confidence in the military.²² This increases risk for Argentina, as its forces are likely to take heavy casualties when mounting an opposed assault against UK land forces that have benefitted from recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. In reality, such an operation would also be highly difficult to prepare for while maintaining any element of surprise.

Secondly, Argentina may wish to carry out limited unarmed subterfuge strategies or aggressive stunts that are aimed at testing UK resolve or embarrassing the UK government. For instance, planting a flag on an island by a small raiding party would discredit the confident messaging that the UK has made on its ability to monitor and defend the islands.²³ Argentina would also achieve temporary domestic, and perhaps international, support for its campaign without risking the lives of troops. This option would, however, accomplish few real gains towards Argentina's ultimate goal of sovereignty over the FI, and it risks backfiring should the provocateurs be caught in the act.

The third option involves Argentina reinforcing its claims by attempting to hinder or prevent UK oil extraction operations using air and maritime forces. The aim would be to force a response, test British resolve, gather intelligence on UK responses, and increase the political and economic cost of maintaining sovereignty of the islands. This would be

²² For instance, Argentina's lack of precision guided munitions, the distance from Argentina with only two air to air refueling aircraft, an aging fleet of combat aircraft, and Argentine deficiencies in fast sea transport, amphibious vessels and C-130 transport aircraft. Mark S. Bell, "Can Britain Defend the Falklands?" *Defence Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 2012): 286-296.

²³ Referring to the effectiveness of FI defenses, Prime Minister David Cameron commented at a National Security Council briefing in January 2014: "...our defenses are strong, our resolve is extremely strong. We have strong defense on the Falklands, that is absolutely key." Sean Rayment. "Defence Chiefs Prepare New Plans to Defend Falkland Island," *The Daily Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/9797902/Defence-chiefs-prepare-new-plans-to-defend-Falkland-Islands.html> (accessed January 31, 2014).

done in tandem with the sponsoring and protecting of Latin American hydrocarbon exploitation in the same geographical area. This approach could be extended to include a Cod War type harassment campaign of the FI fishing fleet in an attempt to further strain the capacity of the UK defensive capability.²⁴ As with the second option, it has the potential to embarrass the UK if it is unable to deal with the crisis through paucity of assets, or back up any threats. For the Argentines, such a mission would not require platforms that are especially modern or well-equipped, but would compel the UK to bolster its maritime surface and surveillance capabilities. Indeed, a prolonged campaign of harassment over a large geographical area that utilizes all available Argentine naval, Prefectura Naval (coast guard), and air force assets is conceivable. Argentina may also be able to leverage partner nations to block logistical and infrastructure support in an attempt to demonstrate international solidarity for Argentina's 'theft of Latin American resources' narrative, as well as reduce the economic viability of the enterprise for investors. Certainly, Fernández has shown increased interest in foreign relations over recent years, in which she may be able to capitalize on. She has steadily reinforced existing links and forged new alliances on trade and security in an effort to increase economic performance and bolster Latin American collective strength. The majority of this collaboration is economic and most defense agreements are at an embryonic stage, so are unlikely to translate into real military capability in the short-term. The relationships that have been built and nurtured are, nevertheless, symbolic of Argentina's growing

²⁴ The Cod Wars were a series of confrontations between the 1950s and 1970s between Britain and Iceland over the rights to fish in Icelandic waters. Icelandic Coast Guard vessels attempted to prevent British vessels fishing within their newly claimed territorial seas which resulted in aggressive clashes, mostly involving incidents of ramming between Icelandic ships and British trawlers, frigates, and tugboats. UK National Archives, "The Cabinet Papers 1915-1984: The Cod Wars," United Kingdom government, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/cod-wars.htm>

influence and improved stable relations with neighboring states. So, while backing is not likely to materialize in the form of direct military support, the bonds that have been formed may provide enough confidence to make this limited challenge against the FI. Taking this option could, however, lead to rapid escalation into an aggressive and costly conflict if the UK acted robustly or if a miscalculation is made by either side.

United Kingdom

Diplomatic

The UK still “punches above its weight,” seeing itself as a global player and “a country whose political, economic and cultural authority far exceeds its size.”²⁵ Its influences are far reaching, for instance: holding a permanent seat on the UNSC; its Commonwealth links; and a major contributor and member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and G20.²⁶ In reality, however, it is more of a medium-size player that has declined in influence since the middle of the twentieth century, with its international status “a central preoccupation of successive British governments since 1945.”²⁷ Although the UK government has designs on a “continued full and active engagement in world affairs,” its attention is presently concentrated on the UK’s membership of the EU.²⁸ This is founded on the growing public antipathy towards Europe that is encouraged by the anti-EU UK Independence

²⁵ Britain “punching above its weight” was the Cold War mantra of former British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. UK National Security Council, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* (London: The Stationary Office, October 2010), 4.

²⁶ The Commonwealth is a voluntary organisation of 54 states whose population comprises of nearly one third of the world’s population.

²⁷ Janes IHS Global, “Janes Sentinel Security Assessment: United Kingdom Country Report,” (Englewood, Colorado: IHS Global Limited, 2013), 123.

²⁸ UK National Security Council, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 4.

Party (UKIP). This issue continues to create friction within and between parties and will gain further prominence as the UK holds a referendum on membership in the EU by 2017. In relation to the FI, this fractious relationship with the EU is hampered by the refusal of EU lawmakers to accept the FI as UK sovereign territory and has occasionally deteriorated its individual relationships with member states. In particular, its relationship with Spain is routinely strained over Britain's ownership of Gibraltar and Argentina has leveraged this disagreement in the past as a point of solidarity on the issue of colonialism.²⁹ In contrast, Britain enjoys a particularly close relationship with the U.S. founded on strong historic links, even though the U.S. has publically distanced itself from supporting the UK on the FI issue.³⁰

The UK is also a signatory to a number of international trade and security agreements across the globe, one of which is a Bilateral Investment Agreement with Argentina. The British government has also recently invigorated efforts to increase commercial ties with primarily Asia, but also with Latin America.³¹ In 2010 the UK signed a defense cooperation treaty with Brazil, to capitalize on the growing defense market in the region. This agreement has paved the way for trade agreements, such as that with British Aerospace (BAE), for the delivery of three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), and assistance with the design and development of Brazil's new frigate-sized

²⁹ Jon Nazca, "Argentina, Spain Join up to Pressure Britain on Falklands and Gibraltar," Reuters, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/26/uk-argentina-spain-gibraltar-idUKBRE98P11720130926> (accessed October 14, 2013).

³⁰ Strong UK-US relations stem from cooperation during both World Wars and, more recently, as a key mediator between the U.S. and Europe. Even during the 1982 Falklands War the U.S. secretly aided the UK with intelligence and crucial arms (such as the sidewinder missile), while maintaining an outwardly neutral stance. Carlos Osorio, "U.S. National Security Archive: Reagan on the Falklands: Give Maggie Enough to Carry on," <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB374/> (accessed November 13, 2013).

³¹ The Political Risk Service Group Inc, "United Kingdom Country Report"(Syracuse: The PRS Group, Inc., 2013), 10.

Global Combat Ship. The UK also supports Brazil's desire to hold a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.³² Some traditional links with Chile also exist that are based on past political and defense sales ties, as well as providing vital support during the Falklands War. In 1999 former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher commented that "without President Pinochet there would certainly have been more [casualties]. We owe him, and Chile, a great debt."³³ Chile's full role in the war is not yet completely clear, but it is known that it provided crucial support in the form of intelligence on Argentine force movements and weather data. Britain's current diplomatic influence in Chile remains centered on an economic partnership that Chile's President, Sebastian Pinera described during a visit to the UK in 2010: "We discussed many things: how to improve and strengthen our economic relations, how to work together in terms of education, clean energies, and many other topics. I am sure that the traditional and historic friendship between Great Britain and Chile is now stronger than ever."³⁴

Information

On the world stage the UK maintains its position on supporting the self-determination of the FI peoples, although it openly states in policy document that the territories offer strategic basing for a range of security operations.³⁵ The UK government's core information campaign has been largely reactive over the FI,

³² Janes IHS Global, "Security Assessment: United Kingdom," 105-106, 349.

³³ Paolo Tripodi, "General Matthei's Revelation and Chile's Role During the Falklands War: A New Perspective on the Conflict in the South Atlantic," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 4 (2003): 121.

³⁴ BBC News, "Chile President Sebastian Pinera Praises UK Friendship," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11570374> (accessed November 15, 2013).

³⁵ United Kingdom Overseas Territory Directorate, *White Paper: The Overseas Territories: Security, Success, Sustainability* (London: UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, June 2012), 8.

noticeably playing down the issue and avoiding confrontation. This approach could be to emphasize the point of self-determination in allowing the FIG to take the lead in voicing its own position. This is evident in a number of instances: during the UN Decolonization meetings, where representation was historically made by a member of the FI Legislative Assembly; in March 2010 a FI delegation, supported by Britain's EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security policy, petitioned the EU to recognize the FI as a UK overseas territory within the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. More recently, during the first half of 2013, more than 100 international journalists from 20 countries visited the FI under invitation from the FI government and members of the Legislative Assembly visited more than 40 countries in support of the overall information campaign.³⁶

Collectively Britain has a highly capable joint and interagency intelligence capability that has global reach and, especially since the 2005 bombings in London, the intelligence community has enjoyed increased funding and priority status for assets. It also benefits from a close cooperation network with other capable nations, such as the U.S. Intelligence resources, however, it heavily focus on counter terrorism.³⁷ In the FI there is a small military-led intelligence cell as part of the British Forces South Atlantic Islands (BFSAI), which places a "premium on accurate intelligence and the ability to

³⁶ Nigel Hayward CVO, "Falklands Governor Delivers Annual Address, 4 Jun 2013," UK government, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/falklands-governor-delivers-annual-address> (accessed August 7, 2013); Merco Press, "Falklands' Delegation at Annual OCT's Forum for Closer Links with European Union," <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/19/falklands-delegation-at-annual-oct-s-forum-for-closer-links-with-european-union> (accessed November 5, 2013).

³⁷ For instance, as of January 2005, some 44 percent of MI5's resources were spent on international CT (up from 33 percent in 2002), 23 percent on Irish CT (down from 28 percent in 2002), 13 percent on security advice, 10 percent on counter espionage, 4 percent on serious crime, 4 percent on external assistance, and 2 percent on counter proliferation. Janes IHS Global, "Security Assessment: United Kingdom," 183.

respond quickly” that has been driven by post-war sensitivities over the poor handling of Argentine intentions in 1982.³⁸

Military

The UK armed forces are in the midst of a restructuring and reform period, while preparing to conclude major combat operations in Afghanistan. For the next seven years the SDSR envisages a rebalancing and re-growing of capabilities to meet the vision set out in FF2020. This translates to an estimated 20-30 percent reduction in operational ambition and deployable capability.³⁹ The focus of this paper is the interim period in which major force cuts are already made prior to the regeneration of the advertised FF2020. Most significantly for the FI and concentrating on expeditionary capability, the early retirement of HMS Ark Royal and the Harrier aircraft fleet, as well as the placing of one Landing Platform Dock (LPD) at extended readiness, is significant. Moreover, Britain’s second aircraft carrier will be decommissioned in 2014, leaving only two capital ships available for contingency operations: one landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) and one LPD. The Royal Navy has, however, made a concerted drive to regenerate its expeditionary skills following a lengthy period of neglect in amphibious operations.⁴⁰

The BFSAI consists of about 1,300 personnel and has a range of joint assets that are focused on the “deterrence of military aggression across the region . . . and to

³⁸ Professor Michael Clarke, “The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012,” *Royal United Services Institute*, <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref%3AC4F6324444BE2E/#.UozfxLFOMM8> (accessed November 20, 2013).

³⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2013,” vol. 113 (London: Routledge, March 14, 2013), 104.

⁴⁰ Capability has declined with the Army and Royal Marines focused in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2012 the Royal Navy deployed twelve ships as part of its second annual ‘Response Force Task Group’ deployment to re-establish the UK amphibious capability.

demonstrate the UK's commitment and capability to defend [the FI]."⁴¹ As of February 2012, the main combat assets includes: four Typhoon fast jet aircraft, a VC-10 tanker aircraft, a Hercules C-130 Aircraft, a Rapier surface-to-air battery, a Frigate or Destroyer, an Auxiliary Tanker, an Ocean Patrol Vessel, and one infantry company.⁴² A nuclear submarine also periodically deploys to the region, though its permanent presence is not advertised. In terms of infrastructure, there is an airfield, a small seaport, and remotely deployed early warning radars as part of the air defense framework. The distance of the FI from the UK is 8000 miles, taking approximately 18 hours by air and the closest UK base is an airfield on the Ascension Islands, located in the Atlantic, 4,200 miles from the UK. This air bridge would be the enabler for immediate reinforcements (i.e. less than 24hrs) from the UK.⁴³

The UK has committed itself to maintaining defense expenditure as two percent of its GDP, which represents the largest defense budget in Europe.⁴⁴ From 2010, however, UK defense operated with an unfunded liability of approximately \$57 billion until 2020.⁴⁵ This is one-sixth greater than the entire defense budget for a year. Much of this liability is tied up in defense procurement and is now budgeted for through strict savings measures on non-front line capabilities and defense contracts. The budget also

⁴¹ UK Ministry of Defence, "Falklands Garrison Still Going Strong," *Announcement*, October 30, 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/falklands-garrison-still-going-strong> (accessed November 10, 2013).

⁴² Louisa Brooke-Holland, "The Defence of the Falkland Islands - Commons Library Standard Note" (Library of the House of Commons, 2012), 2.

⁴³ Military experts and former officials indicate that at least one company of forces could be on the FI within 24 hours. See Bell, "Can Britain Defend the Falklands?" 287.

⁴⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 2013," 93.

⁴⁵ HM Government, *The Strategic Defence and Security Review: Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty* (London: The Stationary Office, October 2012).

continues to decline in real terms, having suffered a 2.11 percent reduction in the latest government spending review.⁴⁶

Economic

The UK economy is approximately the sixth largest in the world. The 2008 global financial crisis impacted upon the UK especially hard and economic growth is now just starting to improve. The coalition government has enforced a number of tight austerity and fiscal stimulus measures in an attempt to recover the economy and reduce borrowing. Although, after reverting into a recession in early 2012, it is unclear on how long the recovery measures will need to take real effect.⁴⁷ Judging by the society's reaction to the economic downturn, social instability is now unlikely to materialize. Nevertheless, the government remains under pressure to demonstrate the sustainability of its policies; meanwhile, government departments face further year-on-year budgetary cuts to balance the books.⁴⁸

Sufficiency of UK means

The UK's influence across a number of key international organizations gives it a significant global voice and credibility. Its declining relative power, coupled with the growing commercial and political interdependence of the major international institutions, however, creates complications in leveraging influence on matters of perceived colonial sovereignty. Certainly, despite flourishing trade relationships with some of Argentina's

⁴⁶ HM Treasury, *Spending Round 2013* (London: The Stationary Office, Jun 2013); from 2015-16 the defense resource budget will maintained at £24 billion and the equipment budget will grow by 1 percent to £14 billion, representing a real term decline of 2.11 percent overall.

⁴⁷ Janes IHS Global, "*Security Assessment: United Kingdom*," 12.

⁴⁸ Joshua Harris and Julian McCrae, "The 2015-16 Spending Round, A Briefing Note to Accompany the IfG/IFS Press Briefing on 7 June 2013" (London: The Institute for Government, 2013), 2-3.

neighbors, Britain's existing relationships in the region are not ranked amongst its strongest in a comparative sense. Furthermore, it is unlikely that support for the UK's position on the FI will develop in Latin America. Even Chile is unlikely to provide the same level of backing as it did in 1982 if tensions increase, as conditions are now significantly different.⁴⁹ These countries are likely to uphold some solidarity with their regional partners above any loyalty to the UK because of their strong economic and political links. Although, in the event of escalation, existing UK ties may be sufficient enough to discourage any involvement that would jeopardize deterrence plans. Among Britain's closest allies, any support in maintaining the desired deterrent effect is likely to be indirect. This would be the desired course of action for the UK government, which would be keen to retain an independent stance and thus its credibility as a major military power.

The effectiveness of Britain's information campaign is difficult to gauge, as international sentiment is an intangible element of international relations. Yet, the stated positions of individual nations seem to remain unchanged, which may indicate that the UK is successfully counteracting Argentine influence. Mostly in response to internal scrutiny in the wake of the SDSR announcements and the recent heightened political rhetoric of Argentina, its messages are consistent and the government is careful to empower the FI legislature to defend its position of self-determination. In support of the information function, the UK has substantial intelligence resources at its disposal, including unrivalled access to U.S. intelligence assets. Given the nature of the capability, the current potency of assets deployed to the region is unknown. While some analysts

⁴⁹ Pinochet's military regime had fallen into isolation and desperately needed to establish partnership, weapon procurement channels and to avoid complete rejection from the international community. See Tripodi, "General Matthei's Revelation and Chile's Role During the Falklands War," 121.

propose that the scope for any Argentine military subterfuge is extremely limited across the archipelago, the islands are a lower priority in Britain's security strategy and so there is scope for informal enterprises that create media attention.⁵⁰

The UK armed forces are in a period of transition with major expeditionary assets depleted and land and air forces engaged in and configured for conflict in Afghanistan. This generates considerable debate over the ability of the UK military to defend or retake the FI following a successful Argentine attack. The government has maintained that current and future force levels are sufficient to provide an adequate deterrence against Argentine aggression. Nonetheless, the deterrence of the FI appears to be predicated on the ability to defend them, rather than the ability to retake them. The SDSR briefing pack states that if the FI were lost, "our very capable garrison and ability to rapidly reinforce by air means that we do not expect to lose them in the first place."⁵¹ In rebuttal of questions asked in the House of Commons, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defense, Gerald Howarth, argued that "all the advice that we have received says that the Argentines have neither the capability nor the intention to repeat the folly of 1982 and that the military deterrent we have is fully up to the task."⁵² The Chiefs of Staff have also fortified the government's position in a letter to The Times newspaper, commenting that the UK Armed forces "have comprehensive defenses in place, unlike 1982" and

⁵⁰ Clarke, "The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012."

⁵¹ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence and Security Review Briefing Pack* (London: Ministry of Defence, October 2010).

⁵² The House of Commons, "Parliamentary Business: Publications and records:Column 488," (London: House of Commons, January 26, 2012), <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120126/debtext/120126-0002.htm#12012667000002> (accessed September 18, 2013).

defensive plans are “robust and able to defend against any and all likely threats.”⁵³ Some analysts support this point of view, citing the mismatch of capability from Argentina’s aging forces being of decisive disadvantage when pitched against a smaller but more modern UK contingent.⁵⁴ Others postulate that even with assumptions in favor of Argentine Forces, it is unlikely that an attack would be successful and it would be an extremely costly enterprise.⁵⁵

There is, however, less confidence in the UK’s ability to retake the archipelago if the airfield at Mount Pleasant is lost. Following the SDSR, there was a flood of criticisms against the proposed defense cuts; *Janes Defence* weekly observed that assumptions were made “about the last wars on the ability of allies to agree, and the efficacy of an “arm’s length” security strategy, that will tightly constrain our flexibility in the coming decade. Such constraints may potentially preclude, as examples, a second Falklands operation or a similar action to that seen in Sierra Leone.”⁵⁶ A report compiled by four former defense Chiefs for the UK National Defence Association sums up the concerns of a number of defense experts: “our assessment is that current force levels are inadequate to hold off even a small-size invasion,” with reinforcements predicated on timely intelligence, and “once lost, the islands would be very difficult to retake, particularly with no taskforce air

⁵³ United Kingdom Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” *The Times* (November 12, 2010).

⁵⁴ Clarke, “The Falklands: The Security Equation in 2012.” Tim Rayment, “Can We Still Defend the Falklands?,” *The Sunday Times*, January 22, 2012, <http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/focus/article860698.ece> (accessed November 20, 2013); Tom de Castella and Megan Lane, “Could the UK Still Defend the Falklands?,” *BBC*, February 27, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17157373> (accessed November 20, 2013).

⁵⁵ Bell, “Can Britain Defend the Falklands?,” 297.

⁵⁶ Carina O’Reilly, “Arm’s Length Approach Sees the UK Doing Less,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (October 10, 2010): 18.

cover.”⁵⁷

The current force configuration in the FI generates a low risk of attack, but the UK leadership perhaps overestimates the capabilities of reactionary forces. Cutting key capabilities early in a bid to make quick savings is a high-risk strategy, and exposes the UK should it become embroiled in a serious and committed fight. Furthermore, unremitting budgetary pressures will continue to force senior military leaders to prioritize and make difficult choices that are sure to erode capability in a number of minor areas. Collectively, these lingering effects of the financial crisis and SDSR have had a negative impact on the deterrence effect in the South Atlantic.

Summary assessment

Referring back to the possible Argentine options, identifying and evaluating the most immediate and threatening challenge to UK response capability shapes the recommendations towards refining British deterrence strategy that this paper makes in the concluding chapter. Accounting for the most extreme scenario also generates a more extensive and resilient approach to the deterrence of the FI.

Of the three possible Argentine challenges, the response that would require the highest number of assets and most demanding response capability is the first option that aims to seize the FI by force. For Argentina to successfully seize the island it must both neutralize UK air superiority and transport enough troops from the Argentine mainland to mount an effective assault on Mount Pleasant airfield. This would be a challenging and risky task for Argentina, but not entirely impossible. There are many impediments to Argentine success, the sum of which indicate that Argentina is unlikely to succeed with

⁵⁷ Sir Michael Graydon, Sir Michael Rose, Sir Jeremy Blackham, Sir Andrew Lambert and Allen Sykes, "*Inconvenient Truths – Threats Justify Prioritising Defence*" (London: United Kingdom National Defence Association, September 2011), 24.

this challenge. This, and the fact that this scenario is based on surprise, makes this challenge even less likely.⁵⁸ However, purely assessing the balance of military superiority in this way is dangerous as history tells us that other dynamic factors can come into play, despite the apparent superiority of a force on paper. For instance in 1982, Argentine aircraft caused significant damage to Royal Naval ships with rudimentary 500 or 1000lb bombs, despite the ships being largely equipped with modern radars and air defense weapons.⁵⁹ Furthermore, elements such as weather and unforeseen maintenance issues may tip the balance in any conflict. This is particularly relevant to the FI with where there is such a small number of air and maritime assets available; the loss of one key component to the FI defense infrastructure would degrade UK capability significantly.⁶⁰

The second Argentine option, which involves limited subterfuge actions, may successfully question British competence to defend the FI and prompt a strengthening of defenses, but it is plainly the least aggressive act. The third option that centers on harassment activities has the potential to escalate into conflict. A lengthy campaign would add further stress to an already taut UK naval fleet program, weakening the ability of Britain to fulfill its other global commitments; forcing an increase in the cost of defending the FI may, therefore, generate doubts amongst its population about the

⁵⁸ The viability of this option is based on the assumption that the British lack the required intelligence of an impending attack, and so they have not been able to reinforce the FI beyond its current force levels.

⁵⁹ HMS GLASGOW, HMS ANTRIM, HMS ARDENT, HMS ANTELOPE, HMS COVENTRY, HMS PLYMOUTH, Sir Tristram, RFA Sir Galahad, RFA Sir Lancelot, Landing Craft (L-703) were all struck and disabled by either 500lb or 1000lb bombs delivered by Argentine fighters.

⁶⁰ An example is in 2010, when two Typhoons and tanker were forced by poor weather to land in Punta Arenas leaving the FI with only two fighters. Mercopress, "Falklands Thick Fog Forces Two RAF Typhoons and Tanker to Land in Punta Arenas," <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/06/04/falklands-thick-fog-forces-two-raf-typhoons-and-tanker-to-land-in-punta-arenas> (accessed January 20, 2014).

viability of the UK continuing to retain the FI.⁶¹ Although this challenge is potentially as threatening to the status quo if a miscalculation is made and the situation deteriorates, this Argentine option will be a likely long-term threat that requires a less expeditious and asset-heavy response.

Clearly there are a number of uncertainties when assessing combat power, so it is difficult to make a compelling case that Argentina would definitely not decide to make a direct challenge for fear of unacceptable losses. Furthermore, when one considers the many important political, economic, and societal factors that affect Argentine strategy, a challenge of such scale cannot be ruled out. Argentine success, regardless of it being a remote possibility, would be hugely devastating to the UK, both in terms of manpower and materiel, as well as international standing. Surprise military action is undoubtedly the most threatening as the UK will not have the chance to reinforce swiftly enough, with sufficient enough force levels, to guarantee the security of the FI against a rapid and sustained attack.

Therefore, to maintain the status-quo for the next 5-10 years, British deterrence strategy needs to be both flexible and comprehensive. It must be able to deter a range of challenges by Argentina, but in particular it needs to deter a direct military attack as the most immediate and profound threat to the UK's political and military credibility to act

⁶¹ In late 2013 General Sir Nick Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff, publically voiced his concerns that the recent manpower cuts mean that the Royal Navy is now "perilously close to its critical mass in manpower terms and was in danger of becoming a hollow force". There has also been criticism following the last defence review that equipment cuts have left the Royal Navy struggling to even protect the UK alongside its other commitments as the government reduced frigate and destroyer numbers to just 19 ships. Ben Coughlin, "Defence Cuts: It's No Use Having Guns With No One to Fire Them," *The Daily Telegraph*, December 2013, 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10528206/Defence-cuts-Its-no-use-having-guns-with-no-one-to-fire-them.html> (accessed February 21, 2014). The Daily Telegraph, "No Warships Left Defending Britain After Defence Cutbacks," <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8862215/No-warships-left-defending-Britain-after-Defence-cutbacks.html> (accessed January 31, 2014).

globally in support of its interests. To do this, the UK needs to target all elements of Argentine national power, while leveraging international relationships and economic might to counter growing Argentine influence. It must also increase the perceived cost of a challenge to the Argentine leadership; particularly now, while UK force capability to defend the FI or conduct a major expeditionary campaign in the South Atlantic to retake the islands is at its most questionable. Argentina may feel that it now has a window of opportunity to capitalize on.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion on approach and recommendations

We learn...that the two extreme views on the proper use of force in international relations are wrong – the view which rejects force altogether as an instrument of foreign policy; and the view which supposes that force can solve everything.”¹

In 1925 Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart wrote that “in human will lies the source and mainspring of all conflict” and so the “goal in war can only be attained by the subjugation of the opposing will.” He further observes that “the chief incalculable is resistance” and the purpose of strategy is “to diminish the possibility of resistance.”² This observation is not just relevant in the extremes of conflict, but this indirect approach of subduing the will of the adversary also sits at the heart of deterrence.

Characterized by a centrally controlled and personality driven power base, subduing Argentine will is the key to a successful British deterrence strategy and, in maintaining the deterrence balance of the FI, two elements directly influence this will: Argentine political calculations and UK force capabilities. Argentine resolve is dependent on how Argentina understands its position within the current dispute and UK strategy will determine how it should orchestrate its resources to affect that understanding. UK policy concentrates on maintaining the status quo at Stage One of the crisis escalation scale (Figure 3), which requires both of these elements to be balanced against one another. There is always some imbalance between the two that generates risk, but in the current climate the imbalance has increased to create an unacceptable level of risk that raises the possibility of an escalation to Stage Two. This risk must be brought back to tolerable levels with limited but sustainable deterrence actions in a way that the desired

¹ Andrew Schlesinger Jr., “Post Mortem on Cuba: Memorandum for the President” (Washington D.C. : The Whitehouse, 1962), 2.

² James D. Atkinson, "Liddell Hart and Warfare of the Future," in *Military Affairs* 29, no. 4 (1965): 163.

political ends can be realized within the limited resources available. This thesis has identified and applied three fundamental components of understanding, communication and credibility to this deterrence problem to make the following broad recommendations for an improved deterrence approach for the UK.

Firstly, any approach taken should target those factors which Argentina draws on to give strength to its claims. Fernández specifically leverages a charge of imperialist control against the UK, accusing it of sheltering behind its seats of power within international institutions and of colonialist rule. Argentina's historical claims and geographical proximity to the Islands also lend weight to its "theft of resources" argument. It leans heavily on these factors to win both internal and external support, which in turn, engenders confidence to push harder on the issue.

The UK must, therefore, integrate strategies that erode these arguments in all forms of messaging. Schemes that discredit the accusation of colonialism without the direct referral or use of Britain's position in major international institutions should be given the fullest backing. The existing scheme that harnesses the UK-centric nationalism to empower the FI government in support of their own case nicely counter-acts the Argentine argument by chiming with the UN's commitment to self-determination. In addition, to dampen South American fears on UK resource exploitation, renewed and strengthened offers of collaboration on environmental management issues and investment opportunities must be pushed. An offer of joint ownership of hydrocarbon extraction is to be avoided as this would act negatively by bolstering the legitimacy of the Argentine claim. Therefore, the UK must continue its engagement with the UN with the twin aim of dissuading the critics of Britain's handling of the issue and provide hope to Argentina

that a peaceful resolution can be reached. The argument to retain sovereignty must be consistent with international law and the narrative must ride the moral high ground, resisting the temptation to influence internal reputations by discrediting the Argentine leadership.

Concerning reputation, the UK must foster the expectation that it will act robustly in support of its national interests. Retreat or failure to act in defense of national or alliance interests will be seen as a sign of weakness that leads others to expect a repeat. Reputations are continuous and so they must be built and maintained, despite changes in leadership. The UK must emphasize its long combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan along with its highly capable Special Operations Forces and its maritime capability.

Secondly, and again to counter Argentine regional influence, emphasis should be given to boosting the flourishing relationships with Brazil and Chile. A multi-tiered approach of encouragement and investment towards industrial, institutional, and military partnerships will reinforce links with these nations, making it increasingly more difficult for Argentina to adopt a hostile approach. Fernández heavily depends on the bonds of Latin American anti-colonialist sentiment to push her cause and also needs the regional coalitions to remain secure and prosperous. In particular, strengthened UK-Brazil relations would engender doubt as to the level of backing in support of any aggressive action. Any escalation would also threaten to weaken these vital alliances that Argentina counts on for economic growth.

Thirdly, commensurate with the level of risk that the UK government is willing to shoulder against its other commitments, resources must be prioritized towards ensuring that a robust network of understanding is established and maintained during this period of

heightened concern. The impulsiveness and continual fracturing of Argentine politics, combined with the fluid nature of its power and personalities, as well as the fragility of the country's economy, provides a multitude of signposts that need to be monitored and analyzed through an understanding of the appropriate heuristic lenses. With supporting UK military forces at significant arms-length from the FI and often committed elsewhere, anticipation and timing is everything; understanding the influential forces that drive Argentine decision makers is essential to avoid the surprise Britain suffered in 1982. So, in terms of capability, not only is intelligence collection and analysis an area for investment, but harnessing the outputs of academic think tanks and other such organizations that have a deep understanding of the issues should also be part of the solution. Timely understanding and comprehensive examination of the external and internal forces affecting the Argentine governmental leaders, including those generated by the UK, will assist decision makers to maintain a proper balance of capabilities that maintain deterrence.

Fourthly, Argentina currently has the capabilities and resources to support a military challenge to the territories, full-scale or otherwise. One may argue, however, that the military contingent stationed in the FI provides a credible enough deterrent to alter Argentine calculations, because in the wake of the 1982 conflict the Argentine leadership has a much clearer idea of expected losses from an unsuccessful challenge. Certainly, with an aging military machine, an invasion could be seen as a risky prospect for Fernández; if an embarrassing defeat ensues, this would be a fatal setback to any diplomatic headway that Argentina has built over the last decade and have significant emotional impact on the Argentine population.

The internationally publicized erosion of UK military capability may have altered the weighting of these perceptions to make the gamble more attractive. The front-loaded cuts that have eroded Britain's operational reach and reported doubts related to Britain's ability to retake the islands should they be lost, creates vulnerabilities and perceived opportunities. To bring the equation back in to balance, the UK must promote its expeditionary capabilities as a matter of priority, being cautious not to feed Fernández's "militarization of the peaceful South Atlantic" argument. Increased frequency of UK expeditionary power projection deployments, in tandem with an information campaign that is crafted to advertise UK Anti-Access/Area-Denial capability and the defensive nature of the forces stationed on the Islands, would achieve this, while avoiding risk of misinterpretation. As such, to avoid misinterpretation of any messaging, the establishment of face-to-face diplomatic engagement and trust at the highest level of government between both nations must be a priority objective.

Following on from this, the period around 2017 will also be of significance to UK force levels and readiness in the South Atlantic. The planned hydrocarbon extraction about this time offers an opening for Argentina to inflame the current state of affairs and capitalize on what will be portrayed as antagonistic British actions. Consequently, a surge of both overt and covert UK activity during this time is essential. Covert capabilities, such as satellite, cyber, and submarines, should be enhanced to monitor key indicators such that real-time Argentine intent and capability can be determined, while maintaining a business-as-usual approach. In concert with this, the FI government must lead a clear and robust overt messaging campaign, supported by the renewed publicizing by the UK government of its expeditionary capability in a manner that is non-attributable to the

current crisis.

Finally, destabilization as a result of further fiscal decline is considered to be the dominant consideration in Argentine political decision-making. Argentina's poor economic performance risks an externalization of the dispute and the potential boost of revenue to the economy that is offered by the oil and gas fields off the FI adds further attraction to any challenge that is being considered. Accordingly, UK foreign policy should be prioritized towards encouraging economic growth and political stability in Argentina and this should be done both directly and indirectly. UK industry is already engaged in Argentina, which offers a valuable avenue to encourage further investment. Additionally, where possible, the UK should leverage its commonwealth and other partnerships to support economic stabilization of Argentina.

The UK has taken a long term-approach to its military vision, taking near-term risks in order to protect funding for future capabilities. This is seen as crucial if its military is to remain a premier, but affordable, military force. The assumption that Argentina poses a lower threat while its forces modernize and its leader declares a peaceful resolution to the dispute seems to mitigate this risk to a certain extent; if this is the case, the strategic gamble to focus funding elsewhere will pay off. Nevertheless, risk of escalation in this interim period is greater than it has been since 1982. Consequently, the UK will have to invest in the right mix of carefully targeted deterrence measures aimed at Argentina's will if it is to guarantee maintaining the status quo and its credibility to project power in defense of its global interests.

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VITA

Most recently Lt Cdr Tilden served as Second in Command of HMS SUTHERLAND, during which time he deployed twice to the Middle East in support of regional maritime security and stability operations. He was commissioned into the Royal Navy in 1992 before then being selected for a University place, and on graduating he qualified as a British Sea Fisheries Officer to serve in HMS LINDISFARNE as Boarding Officer. Later he served in the frigate HMS IRON DUKE as Communications Officer when the ship was acting in support of NATO operations in Kosovo. Following this, as Navigating Officer of the destroyer HMS CARDIFF in 2000, he returned to the West Indies on counter-narcotics operations and took part in the disaster relief of Belize in the wake of Hurricane Keith. In 2002 he took command of Gibraltar Patrol Vessel HMS TRUMPETER and then HMS SABRE in 2003 and in this post he was involved in the Force Protection to visiting warships during OP TELIC. On promotion he was appointed to HMS EXETER as Operations Officer where he deployed to the South Atlantic. Following this, he took up the post of Senior Naval Officer Germany, Staff Officer Expeditionary Warfare and lead for Counter-Piracy at the German Maritime Tactical Centre. Lt Cdr Tilden has an honors degree in Maritime Defense, Management and Technology and is fluent in German.